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Notes & Comments
Ascertaining Duty of Care in the Life Insurance
Industry: A Survey of Insurance Law and a
Proposal for State Mandatory
Disclosure Legislation
Imagine the following: you have been diagnosed with a fatal

illness. Had the illness been detected early, you might have responded favorably to immediate and proper medical treatment.
Now imagine that a life insurance company discovered your particular illness, months ago, upon an examination it performed pursuant to an application for life insurance. The insurance company,
however, never informed you of the results of the examination, and
in many jurisdictions is under no legal duty to do so.1
Despite the overwhelming health risks associated with nondisclosure, numerous cases permit a life insurance company, with
knowledge of an individual's adverse medical condition, to remain
inactive. 2 Applicants that have submitted to such examinations
have lost potentially valuable treatment time. In addition, nondisclosure can also result in exposing health risks to third parties. 3 In
New York, an insurer's duty to disclose the results of an applicant's
blood test that confirms a positive reading for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") is imposed by statute. 4 Although a statutory duty is imposed in such circumstances, the duty to disclose
1 Nolan v. First Company Life Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 81 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2001);
Doe v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243 (D. Md. 1995); Doe v. Jackson
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Miss. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S. Ct. 956, 136 L. Ed. 2d. 843 (1997); LoDico
v. Caputi, 129 A.D.2d 361, 517 N.Y.S.2d 640 (4th Dept. 1987); Petrosky v. Brasner,
695 N.Y.S.2d 281, 181 Misc. 2d 897 (1999), affd, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 729 A.D.2d 75
(1st Dep't 2001); appeal denied, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 1045 (N.Y. May 3, 2001); Ervin
v. Am. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 376 Pa. Super. 132, 545 A.2d 354 (1988). For a full
discussion of these cases, see infra notes 40-123 and accompanying text.
2
See infra notes 37-130 and accompanying text (exploring how failing to
notify an applicant of an adverse medical condition does not constitute actionable
negligence).
3
Such health risks include exposing third parties to tuberculosis, hepatitis,
and the Human Immunodeficiency Virus. See Part IV B of this Note for a detailed
discussion.
4 26 N.Y. INs. L. § 2611 (2001).
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5
does not extend to other potentially life-threatening situations. It
is the position of this Note that such insurance disclosure legislation must be adopted for New York State residents as a means of
protecting the public welfare, both on the individual and collective
level.
Part I of this Note provides background information about the
insurance industry and the practice of underwriting. 6 Part II analyzes precedent and illustrates that other jurisdictions, which have
addressed the issue, have unilaterally concluded that a duty of disclosure does not exist without engaging in an analysis of the duty
issue. 7 Part III proposes an extended duty of care to encompass
disclosure to applicants discovered to have an adverse medical condition. 8 It provides that other institutions that perform medical
screening examinations are under a legal duty to disclose, and
posits that this duty should be extended to the life insurance company.9 Part V discusses health risks posed to the insurance applicant in addition to the general community associated with
nonmandatory disclosure.' 0 Part V presents legal and policy arguments for mandatory disclosure legislation; it applies a risk-utility
analysis and introduces policy arguments which provide that the
current system cannot remain intact. II Part VI advocates legislation
extending the benefits of New York State mandatory disclosure legislation.' 2 Lastly, Part VII discusses how advances in genomic research fuel concern for genetic discrimination.' 3 This Note
concludes with a discussion of how mandatory insurance disclosure

5 See, e.g., Petrosky, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281 (noting that under New York law, no
statutory duty exists imposing disclosure by an insurer, with exception to HIV test
results).
6 See infra notes 15-36 and accompanying text.
7 The courts simply listed considerations of policy in determining whether a
duty exists without examination of the considerations. See Doe v. Jackson Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. at 496; Doe v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. at
251; Hannah E. Greenwald, What You Don't Know Could Save Your Life: A Case
for Federal Insurance Disclosure Legislation, 102 DICK. L. REV. 131, 136 (1997)
(noting courts' conclusory analysis). Infra notes 37-130 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 131-167 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 131-163 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 168-208 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 209-233 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 234-261 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 262-324 and accompanying text.
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legislation must be enacted to protect the insurance applicant's in4
terest in his or her personal medical information.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

ABOUT THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY

Underwriting Process

Insurance is an "arrangement for transferring and distributing
risk."'15 When an individual applies for life insurance, the underwriting process permits the insurance company to determine existing differences between their applicants, and then, to classify
these differences according to their corresponding prospective
risks. 16 Underwriting is defined as the "process by which a life insurance company determines whether or not it can accept an application for life insurance, and if so, on what basis."' 7 The primary
purpose for the underwriting process is an attempt to accurately
predict future mortality and subsequent related costs so that insurers are in a position to make informed decisions by identifying and
evaluating potential losses. 1 8 Individual characteristics impacting
risk assessment include age, health history, general physical condiSee infra notes 325-332 and accompanying text.
ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW 1.2, at 2 (1971). For excellent discussions of the economics of risk and insurance, see EJAN MACKAAY, THE EcoNOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW, 173-180 (1982), and A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMIcs, 53-58 (2d ed., 1989).
16
Herman T. Bailey, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 780 (1976). The ability to classify insurance applicants protects insurance companies from "adverse selection," which is defined as
the "tendency of persons who are poorer risks to seek insurance to a greater extent
than do persons who are better risks." See also JANICE E. GREIDER ET AL., LAW
AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 400 ( 5 h ed. 1984). Without this classification system, insurance companies would become insolvent. Id. See also JON S.
HANSON, REGULATION OF LIFE INSURANCE BUSINESS, at 156-158, (1996) (noting
that a growing AIDS population threatens the insurance company's ability to control the risks associated with illness and death); WOLCOTT B. DUNHAM, JR., NEW
14
15

YORK INSURANCE LAW,

Volume 2 at 32-36 (2000) (commenting that because an

insurer's acceptance and classification of risk is necessarily based upon the information obtained through the medical examination, the accuracy of such information is crucial to the exercise of sound business judgment); Judith A. Berman,
Current Legal Issues in AIDS: AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance Underwriting: A ParadigmaticInquiry, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1059, 1068-1073 (evaluating
the economic rationale of risk classification).
17

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK,

at 128 (1997).
18 Karen A. Clifford & Russell P. luculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1987).
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tion, gender, occupation, and use of alcohol and tobacco. 19 "It is
the understanding of the way these various [characteristics] influence mortality that enables [life insurance] companies to classify
applicants into groups or classes with comparable mortality risks to
'20
be charged appropriate premium rates."
A life insurance policy is medically underwritten on the basis
of health information obtained through an application process and
diagnostic testing. 21 The applicant is required to answer questions
about his or her personal medical history.22 In addition to these
inquiries, some insurance companies require medical examinations. 23 Typically, these exams are performed by paramedicals who
are licensed health professionals and who are often independent
contractors hired by the insurance company. 24 The paramedical's
role includes obtaining the applicant's medical history, physical
measurements, and diagnostic specimens. 25 Insurance companies
typically require urinalysis as a means for screening for medications, illegal drug use, and the presence of nicotine. 26 Blood
profiles are used to test for the presence of antibodies or antigens to
the HIV virus, cholesterol and related lipids, diabetes, heart risk
factors, antibodies to hepatitis, immune disorders, and to assess the
proper functioning of the liver and kidneys. 27 Blood tests are also
used to test for malignancies. 28 More specialized procedures in19 Id. See also R. MEHR, E. CAMMAK & T. ROSE, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE
at 657-659 ( 8th ed. 1985); C. WILL, LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY UNDERWRITING 6,
8-19 (1964); 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 780 (1976).
20 WILL, supra note 19, at 6.
21 JOSEPH MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 250-256 (1962); DUNHAM, supra note
16, at 32-6 (2000).
22 See MACLEAN, supra note 21, at 250-256. See also HARRY P. KAMEN &
WILLIAM

J.

TOPPETA,

THE LIFE INSURANCE

LAW

PRESENTED TO THE ASSOCIATION OF LIFE INSURANCE

OF NEW YORK:
COUNSEL,

PAPER

at 243 (1989);

DUNHAM, supra note 16, at 32-36 (2000).
23 See MACLEAN, supra note 21, at 250-256; HANSON, supra note 15, at
KAMEN & TOPPETTA, supra note 22, at 243; DUNHAM, supra note 16, at

158;
32-6

(2000).
24
Lisa Karam Middleton, Life InsuranceMedical Exams at http://moneycentral.msn.com.article/insure/life/5077.asp (last visited November 5, 2001).
25 Id.
26 See MACLEAN, supra note 20, at 252.
27 See Greenwald, supra, note 7 at 136. Since the 1980's almost all life insurers have screened applicants for AIDS. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Aids and Insurance:
How Private Health Coverage Relates to HIV/AIDS Infection and to Public Programs, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1561, 1585 (1992).
28 See Greenwald, supra, note 7.
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29
clude electrocaridiograms, which are used to assess heart function.
An underwriter then reviews the life insurance application and the
results of the medical exam. 30 Based on these factors, the company
will either extend an offer for coverage, decline the insurance coverage applied for, or make an offer to issue insurance coverage at a
31
higher than standard rate.

B.

Insurability Condition Precedent to Contractual Liability

The creation of a valid and enforceable life insurance contract

is no different from the creation of most forms of contracts. 32 Customarily, the completion of the insurance application merely consti-

tutes an offer to contract. 33 The insurance contract is not complete
until the offer is accepted by the insurer.34 Thus, life insurance coverage is conditioned on the applicant's insurability. 35 Due to the
absence of a contractual relationship with an applicant who is not
an insurable risk, courts reason that a life insurance company does
36
not owe a duty of disclosure to an applicant.

II.

MEDICAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE CASES

Applicable precedent provides that plaintiffs in insurance nondisclosure cases have not prevailed. 37 In repeatedly ruling in favor
29

Id. See also, Robert Goldstone, How to Sell Clients on Underwriting,NA-

TIONAL UNDERWRITING, September 1991, at 7, 8.
30 DUNHAM, supra note 16, at 32-6 (2000).
31 See generally, HOLMES, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE,

§ 10.2; Petrosky v.
Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 283 (respondent attempted to offer proposed policy
based on "tobacco rates.").
32 HOLMES, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, § 10.2., § 10.1; KAMEN & TOPPETTA,
supra note 22, at 150-151; Goldberg v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 284 A.D. 678, 679680, 134 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (2d Dept. 1954), appeal dismissed, 308 N.Y. 958, 127
N.E.2d 99 (1955).
33 HOLMES § 10.2.
34 Id.
35
KAMEN & ToPPETIrA, supra note 22, at 243; DUNHAM, supra note 16, at

32-6 (2000);

COUCH ON INSURANCE,

§ 24:1.

See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7.
Id.; Nolan v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. 2001)
(holding that no duty exists requiring insurance companies to disclose all pre-insurance examination results); Doe v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243 (D.
Md. 1995) (holding that no professional and expert position was assumed by insurer with respect to plaintiff's physical condition and well-being, and therefore,
claim of negligence must fail as a matter of law); Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
944 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (holding that an insurer has no duty to inform
an insurance applicant of the results of a medical examination where the insurer
36
37
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of the life insurance companies, the courts have proceeded on a
negligence analysis, reasoning that insurance companies do not owe
a duty to the applicant, and therefore, failure to notify the applicant
of an adverse medical condition does not constitute a breach of
duty. 38 As such, courts generally have not imposed liability on life
39
insurance companies.

In Jane Doe v. PrudentialLife Insurance Company,40 Jane Doe
completed an application for life insurance with Prudential Life In-

surance Company ("Prudential"). 41 A laboratory representative
visited the Doe's home to conduct the medical exam, which included a blood test. 42 The informed consent form stated that the
blood sample would be subjected to testing that may include a de-

termination of the presence of antibodies or antigens to HIV, other
blood constituents, and drugs.4 3 Jane found the tests unobjection44
able, reviewed and signed the form, and submitted to the tests.
administers the examination only to determine the insurability of the applicant);
LoDico v. Caputi, 129 A.D.2d 361 (4th Dept. 1.987) (providing that an examination
conducted solely for the purpose of determining insurability is an insufficient basis
on which to impose a duty); Petrosky v. Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1999) (holding
that insurer had no duty to disclose data it obtained pursuant to an application for
life insurance); Ervin v. Am. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 376 Pa. Super. 132, 545 A.2d
354 (1988) (affirming trial court's ruling that recovery will be denied for a failure
by a physician, employed by an insurance company, to disclose the presence of
cardiac abnormalities pursuant to a medical examination).
38 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 138-148, discussing how courts have relied on
the common law in holding that no duty exists by insurance companies to their
applicants.
39 See generally, id., discussing the delineated cases supra note 37, (not including Petrosky) in the federal context, and remarking on the courts' failure to
impose a duty. Greenwald advocates for the Medical Privacy in the Age of New
Technologies Act (H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. 2), which focuses solely on applicant
accessibility to health information (rather than affirmative disclosure to applicants), and remedies for breaches of confidentiality resulting from nonconsented
disclosure to third parties; it is the position of this Note the New York must enact
its own state regulation policies without delay. This Note highlights the need for
mandatory disclosure legislation in New York by incorporating the recent Petrosky
case (2001), where the court erroneously analyzed the duty issue, in part, because
of the absence of New York precedent. This Note also provides a proposed state
statute regulating insurance disclosure in the APPENDIX.
40 860 F. Supp 243 (D. Md. 1995).
41 Id. at 245.
42

Id.

43

Id. at 245-246
Id. at 246.

44
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The blood test confirmed that Jane was HIV positive. 45 Prudential rejected Jane's application for life insurance based on the
results of the blood test. 46 The rejection letter stated that the appli47
cation was denied because of "the results of [Jane's] blood test.
Jane requested that Prudential apprise her of the test results; Prudential opted not to honor her request, stating it was the company's
preference to release the results to a physician. 48 Jane again requested that the test results be released directly to her, and again,
Prudential refused. 49 At the time Prudential rejected the application, Jane was eight months pregnant and an illicit drug user. 50 She
assumed that Prudential rejected her application because the blood
test revealed the presence of illegal substances. 51 Jane feared that
her child would be removed from her care if a physician discovered
that she was an illicit drug user; she therefore chose not to desig52
nate a physician.
Following the birth of her child, Jane remained unaware of her
HIV-positive status until more than twenty months after her application for insurance. 53 Jane subsequently commenced a negligence
suit against Prudential, alleging that she was deprived of "an early
opportunity to obtain appropriate and necessary medical treatment,
which would have significantly increased her life expectancy. '54 The
court denied recovery, reasoning that under Maryland common
law, Prudential did not owe a duty to Jane because of the absence
of any case law holding a duty to disclose under similar circumstances.5 5 The court further noted that no statutory duty existed
since legislation had not been enacted within the state that addressed this issue. 56 In its duty analysis, the court stated that the
45 Id.
46 860
47 Id.
48 Id.

F. Supp at 246.

860 F. Supp 243.
Id. at 247
Id.
860 F. Supp at 247.
Id. In the course of her treatment for a wrist injury, Jane received a cortisone injection. The physician accidentally pricked his own finger with the needle.
As a precautionary measure, the physician asked Jane to submit written authorization to Prudential to release the results of her blood test, which confirmed a positive HIV reading.
54 Id. at 245.
55 Id. at 251.
56 Id.
49

50
51
52
53

58
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duty element in a negligence action is "an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the plaintiff is entitled to protection. ' 57 Such considerations
include:
The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and the consequences to the community of
imposing duty to exercise care with resulting liability
for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
58
insurance for the risk involved.
Despite acknowledging these considerations, the court precipitately concluded that no duty existed without analyzing these policy
considerations. 59 In addition, in considering the breach element,
the court concluded that, even assuming a duty existed, Prudential
fulfilled its duty by the its willingness to release Jane's test results to
a physician. 60 The court found that Jane was contributorily negligent for her own injuries because "[o]ne simple act on [her] part
would have avoided any harm which resulted from her failure to
'6 1
know ... that she was HIV positive."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
presented with similar facts in Doe v. Jackson National Life Insurance Company.62 In Jackson, the court ruled that the life insurance
company had no obligation to disclose to the applicant that he
tested positive for the AIDS virus. 63 The applicant, Frank Deramus, submitted to blood tests in accordance with Jackson's underwriting policies.64 The results of the blood test revealed that he was
57 Id.
58 Id. (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53 at 358 ( 5 th ed.
1984)).
59 860 F. Supp at 252.
60 Id. at 253.
61 Id. at 254.
62 Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996), affg 944 F.
Supp. 488 (S.D. Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S. Ct. 956, 136 L. Ed.
2d. 843 (1997).
63 944 F. Supp at 497.
64 944 F. Supp at 490.
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HIV positive. 65 However, Jackson never informed Deramus or his
physician of his HIV status. 66 Deramus was sent a rejection letter,
and thereafter requested that all medical information be forwarded
to his physician. 67 After receiving no response, Deramus made the
same request in a second letter; Jackson still did not honor the request, because, as Jackson asserted, "there was absolutely no undertaking to protect [the applicant and his wife] from any health care
risk. "68

Eighteen months after Jackson discovered his HIV condition,
Deramus learned that he was HIV positive during a hospital stay. 69
Deramus requested a third time that Jackson submit the results of
his medical exam to his physician. 70 Nine days before his death,
Jackson finally sent the results of his medical examination, includ71
ing the results of his HIV test to Deramus' physician.
Following his death, Deramus' wife commenced suit claiming
that Jackson breached its duty to disclose the results of her husband's blood tests. 72 The court however, entered summary judgment in favor of Jackson, concluding that "an insurer has no duty to
inform an insurance applicant of the results of a medical examination where the insurer administers the examination only to determine the insurability of the applicant. ' 73 The plaintiff offered
multiple legal theories as a basis for a legally imposed duty.7 4 She

asserted that Jackson had a duty of disclosure because a "confidential relationship" evolved between Jackson and Deramus because of
the company's access to his personal medical information. 75 The
court disagreed, reasoning that in order for a confidential relation66

Id.
Id.

67

Id.

65

Brief for Appellee at 41, Deramus (No. 60675).
944 F. Supp at 491. During this time, Deramus received no treatment for
the disease and, unaware of his condition, repeatedly exposed his wife to the disease. "In sleeping in my husband's arms, the safest place I knew of, I was sleeping
with one of the deadliest diseases known to mankind," says Jody Deramus, Frank's
widow. "The company that insured his life knew all this so very well, yet neither I
nor my husband could know." See Curtis Rist, Deadly Secret: FrankDeramus Was
Dying, But His Insurer Didn't Tell Him Why, PEOPLE, October 7, 1996, at 73.
68

69

71

Id.
Id.

72

Id. at 489.

73
74
75

Id.
944 F. Supp at 493-498.

70

Id. at 492.

60
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ship to exist, one must justifiably expect the other to protect him or
her from risk. The court stated:
[Jackson] in no way misled [the applicant] into any inaction. [Jackson] never promised that [Jackson] would
warn [the applicant] of any medical risks . . . nor did
[Jackson] ever advise that its silence was to the specific
result of the medical exam should be construed as a
positive medical finding ... This set of circumstances
hardly shows any justifiable reliance by [the applicant]
that [Jackson] would do anything other than perform
76
the limited function of a life insurance business.
The court further stated that an insurance company should not
be held to the same standards as physicians. 77 In rejecting the claim
that Jackson had a duty to warn of foreseeable harm, 78 the court
found no evidence demonstrating that the company's failure to disclose the applicant's test results proximately caused Deramus'
death, because he: (1) was HIV positive before applying for life
insurance; (2) was on notice that Jackson found him uninsurable for
medical reasons; (3) knew that Jackson had conducted blood tests;
and (4) was under private medical care. 79 For these reasons, the
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.8 0
Most decisional law provides that liability is denied due to the
absence of a physician-patient relationship.8 1 This was the reasoning employed in LoDico v. Caputi,82 where the court held that
where a doctor conducts an examination solely for an insurance
company, the doctor is not liable to the examinee for failure to diagnose a latent medical condition. 83 Plaintiff, LoDico, injured himself during the course of employment, and filed for worker's
compensation benefits. 84 The insurance carrier's physician examined him, and forwarded a report to the insurance company,
stating that, in his opinion, LoDico could return to work without
76
77
78
79

Id.

82
83
84

Id.

Id. at 493.

Id. at 495.
Id. at 495-496.
80 Id. at 496.
81 See LoDico v. Caputi, 129 A.D.2d 361; see also generally, Greenwald supra
note 7.
Id. at 362.
Id.
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restrictions or limitations. 85 Subsequent to the examination,
86
LoDico was diagnosed as having a brainstem tumor.
Plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice action, asserting
that the physician committed malpractice in failing to diagnose the
brainstem tumor. 87 LoDico is illustrative of a court's reluctance to
allow recovery for negligence against a physician in the absence of a
physician-patient relationship. The court found that no such relationship existed-express, implied, or contractual-that would indicate a breach of professional duty to LoDico.8 8 The court reasoned
that the physician was performing services solely for the insurance
company-plaintiff did not independently solicit him, nor did
LoDico contend that he sought medical advice or treatment from
89
the physician.
Jackson and Prudentialhighlight the need for mandatory insurance disclosure legislation in an effort to prevent loss of treatment
time and health risks to third parties that can result from the highly
infectious HIV virus. Currently, in New York, an insurer's duty to
disclose the results of an HIV test that forms a basis for an adverse
underwriting decision 90 is imposed by statute. 91 Section 2611 of the
New York Insurance Law provides:
In the event that an insurer's adverse underwriting decision is based in whole or in part on the result of an
HIV related test, the insurer shall notify the individual
of the adverse underwriting decision and ask the individual to elect in writing, unless the individual has already done so, whether to have the specific HIV
related test results disclosed directly to the individual
or to such other person as the individual may designate. If the individual elects to receive the HIV related
test results directly, the insurer shall advise the individual that he or she may call the department of health's
statewide toll-free telephone number for further infor85

Id.

86

Id.
129 A.D.2d at 362.

87

Id. at 363.
Id. at 363-364.
90 An "adverse underwriting decision" means: (A) a declination of insurance coverage as applied for; or (B) an offer to issue insurance coverage at a
higher than standard rate. See 26 N.Y. Ins. L. § 2611.
88
89

91 26 N.Y. Ins. L. § 2611.
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mation about AIDS, the meaning of HIV related test
results, and the availability and location of HIV related
counseling services and shall also advise such individual to consult with a physician about the meaning of
and need for counseling, where appropriate, as to the
HIV related test results. 92
Despite the life insurer's legal duty in New York to disclose the
results of an HIV test to an applicant, no such duty exists if the test
results yield other adverse medical conditions. 93 In Petrosky v.
Brasner,94 a case of first impression in New York, the court was
confronted with the question of whether an insurer had a duty to
disclose unfavorable electrocardiogram results to an applicant. 95
Frank Petrosky sought life insurance through United States Life Insurance Company ("US Life"). 96 In connection with Petrosky's application, Examination Medical Services ("EMSI") conducted
medical tests, which included blood and urine samples, and an electrocardiogram. 97 US Life rejected Petrosky's application, but offered a proposed policy for a shorter term and one-half the
coverage which was based upon, according to US Life, "tobacco
rates."98 Petrosky alleged that he unsuccessfully attempted to contact his US Life insurance agent on several occasions. 99 Approximately forty-five days after US Life received his test results, Frank
92
Article 26 N.Y. Ins. L. § 2611(c). The statute defines AIDS as Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome as it may be defined from time to time by the Centers for Disease Control of the United States Public Health Service. See N.Y. Ins.
L. § 2611(d)(2).
93 See Petrosky v. Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 285, supra note 2. On appeal, the
court stated that had the Legislature intended to extend to extend the duty to
other circumstances, it would have expressly done so. 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 343. The
dissent rejected the majority's suggestion that it must be inferred from 26 N.Y. Ins.
L. § 2611(c) that the Legislature intended that no duty be imposed upon insurers
to disclose test results of any kind other than HIV test results. See infra note 234.
See also Nolan v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. 2001) (reaffirming Petrosky by holding that imposition of a duty is best left to the policy making branch of the government-the Legislature: "It is not a function of a court to
expand legislation as a court might think more desirable."). Id. at 87.
94 695 N.Y.S.2d 281, 181 Misc. 2d 897 (1999).
95 695 N.Y.S.2d at 283-284.
96 Id. at 283.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 283-284 (blood chemistry report indicated that applicant used
tobacco).
99 Id. at 284.
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Petrosky was brought to the emergency room, where he suffered a
fatal heart attack. l00 Petrosky's widow initiated suit against US
Life, EMSI, and other parties, claiming that a serious heart condition was implicated by the findings of the tests reported to US Life,
which breached its duty by denying Petrosky "the opportunity to
seek an evaluation and ultimately treatment."'' 1
Remarking on the absence of New York precedent, the court
relied on authority from other states and held that the deceased had
102
no right to rely on an insurance company to protect his interests.
The court acknowledged that in the absence of a legal duty, there is
no breach, and without a breach, there is no liability. 10 3 The court
stated, "[t]he imposition of duty presents a question of law for the
courts ... resting on policy considerations of whether plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against defendant's conduct. ' 10 4 The court then noted that the law generally requires an
affirmative misrepresentation before imposing liability.10 5 The
court concluded that the relationship of the parties did not give the
deceased a right to rely upon the insurance company for medical
information, since the examination was conducted solely for the
purpose of determining the deceased's insurability. 10 6 In support of
07
its holding, the court relied solely on Jackson and Prudential.
Contrariwise, in Meinze v. Holmes, 108 the court imposed a duty
on an insurer to disclose any adverse medical findings resulting
from an examination. 10 9 Meinze applied for disability benefits,
which required medical examinations.I 10 Both physicians who examined Meinze acknowledged that he suffered from hypertension,
was at considerable risk for developing a myocardial infarction, and
100 Id.
101 Id.

Id. at 285.
Id. (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 342 (1928)).
Id. at 285.
Id. But see PROSSER, TORTS § 33 at 179 ( 4 th ed. 1941) ("[A] failure to
disclose the existence of a known danger may be the equivalent of a misrepresentation, where it is expected that the other will rely upon the appearance of
safety."); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229, 232-233
(1956) (examinee should be entitled to rely "on the expectation that he would be
told of any dangerous condition actually disclosed by that examination.").
106 695 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
107 695 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
108 532 N.E.2d 170 (1987).
109 532 N.E.2d at 174.
110 Id. at 171.
102
103
104
105
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should significantly restrict his physical activities.1 11 The insurance
112
company, however, did not inform Meinze of these results.
Meinze died after suffering a fatal heart attack, which may have
been prevented with timely treatment.11 3 The Meinze court found
that the duty of care arises from an extension of the duty of an

examining physician who has assumed a professional position with
respect to the examinee's medical condition.1 14 Distinguishing
Meinze, the Petrosky court concluded that Meinze was not control-

ling because, unlike in Meinze, there was no examining physician
11 5
upon whom to impose a duty.

Jackson, Prudential,LoDico, and Petrosky provide that the definitive factor in deciding whether to impose liability is the determi11 6
nation of whether or not a doctor-patient relationship existed.
As such, if the courts had applied this principle consistently, each
plaintiff would have been entitled to recovery, or at minimum, a
11 7
legal duty would have been imposed on the insurance company.
The involvement of physicians is inherent in every life insurance
application process.1 18 Although the examination is conducted by a
paramedical, a licensed physician is certainly interpretingthe results

of every examination.11 9 Every life insurance company employs a
licensed physician whose duties as medical director include review111
112

Id.

Id. at 174.

Id. at 172.
532 N.E.2d at 174.
115 695 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
116 Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Miss. 1995),
affd, 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S. Ct. 956, 136 L.
Ed. 2d. 843 (1997) (holding that insurance company should not be held to same
standard as physicians); Jane Doe v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243 (D.
Md. 1995) (denying recovery based in part because physician employed by insurance company had not assumed advisory role traditionally associated with professional expertise); LoDico v. Caputi, 129 A.D.2d 361, 517 N.Y.S.2d 640 (4th Dept.
1987) (holding that when physician conducts examination solely for insurance
company, physician is not liable to examinee for failure to diagnose latent medical
condition); Petrosky v. Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281, 181 Misc. 2d 897 (1999), aff'd,
718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 729 A.D.2d 75 (1StDep't 2001); appeal denied, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS
1045 (N.Y. May 3, 2001) (court found no examining physician on which to impose
a duty).
117 See Greenwald, supra note 7, at 162.
118 MACLEAN, supra note 21, at 250-256.
113

114

119 Id.
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120
ing the report of every examination conducted on an applicant.
As this Note provides, it seems illogical to deny recovery for those
plaintiffs and those survived by the deceased simply because the
applicant and the physician did not have a personal encounter, even
though the physician undertakes the role of evaluating each individual's medical information in the same manner as any primary care
physician. This narrow interpretation neglects to take into consideration the fact that a physician is diagnosing the condition of each
applicant; the absence of a physical examination should not detract
from a physician's ethical responsibility to exercise due care to
other persons. 121 The Prudentialcourt never addressed the physician's participation. 122 Instead, the court hastily concluded, without
consideration, that the physician's purpose was to act solely for the
benefit of the insurance company and not to otherwise treat or ben123
efit the applicant.
Despite the existing precedent, the role that physicians play in
124
creating a duty of disclosure is unclear rather than solidified.
Even in cases where a physician, employed by a life insurance company, has direct involvement in the application process, courts

continue to deny recovery. 125 In Ervin v. American Guardian Life
Insurance Co.,' 26 plaintiff submitted to medical tests conducted by

company physicians, in accordance with American's underwriting
policies. 127 Within one month of these tests, Ervin died of a heart
attack. 128 Ervin's widow filed suit, claiming that the company physicians and the medical director who reviewed the reports failed to
report to Ervin that he suffered from cardiac abnormalities. 129 The
court found that American did not owe a duty to apprise Ervin of
120

See Greenwald, supra note 7, at 162. See also

MACLEAN

supra note 21, at

357.
121 LoDico v. Caputi, 129 A.D.2d 361,364-365,517 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642-643 (4th
Dept. 1987) (Green, J., dissenting); see also Ranier v. Frieman, 294 N.J. Super. 182,
190, 682 A.2d 1220 (App. Div. 1996) (articulating that a physician's duty is "to
make a professionally reasonable and competent diagnosis" in the context of an
examination requested by a third-party entity).
122 See Greenwald, supra note 7, at 162.
123 860 F. Supp at 252.
124 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 162.
125 See Ervin v. American Guardian Life Ins. Co., 376 Pa. Super. 132, 545
A.2d 354 (1988).
126 545 A.2d 354 (1988).
127 545 A.2d at 355.
128

Id.

129

Id.
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any adverse medical findings-their only duty was to determine
130
whether Ervin was "an insurable risk."

III.

PROPOSED EXTENSION OF DUTY OF CARE

A.

Expansion of Duty of Disclosure

The courts have held that a duty of disclosure exists even when

a doctor acts primarily for the benefit of a third party, with exception only for life insurance companies.131 Several cases support the
proposition that employers must disclose the results of medical examinations to both prospective and actual employees. 132 The dif-

ferences between an employee examinee and an insurance
applicant examinee are effectively indistinguishable. 133 Analogous
to the life insurance company, employers who require prospective
130

Id.

See 860 F. Supp. 243; 944 F. Supp. 488; 129 A.D.2d 361; 695 N.Y.S.2d 281;
376 Pa. Super. 132, 545 A.2d 354.
132 See O.H. Webster, Annotation, Master's Liability for Failure to Inform
Servant of Disease or Physical Condition Disclosed by Medical Examination, 69
A.L.R.2d 1213 (1995). For example, in Dornak v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 399 So. 2d
168 (La. 1981), the court held that once an employer undertakes to give a prospective employee a pre-employment examination, the employee can rely on the expectation that he or she would be told of a dangerous condition actually disclosed
by the examination. See also McKinney v. Bellevue Hosp., 183 A.D.2d 563; 84
N.Y.S.2d 538 (t Dept. 1992) (duty imposed to pre-employment doctor who failed
to disclose to prospective employee that a malignant tumor infiltrated his left lung;
131

court elaborated by noting that the burden of placing a duty upon the employer to
disclose was "slight and promoted the public welfare"); Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d
291 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that "when an individual is required, as a condition of
future or continued employment, to submit to a medical examination, that examination creates a relationship between the ... physician and the examinee, at least

to the extent of the tests conducted"); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18
Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1959) (imposition of liability
because employer failed to inform employee that he had tuberculosis); Dornak v.
Lafayette, 399 So. 2d 168, 170-171 (La. 1961) (hospital owed prospective employee
a duty to disclose tubercular condition which it discovered during pre-employment
examination); James v. United States, 483 F. Supp 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (prospective employer failed to inform applicant that he had a carcinoma located in the
lung and mediastinum); Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 503 P.2d 1366 (Cal.
1972) (prospective employee lost valuable treatment time because he was unaware
that he had bone marrow cancer).
133
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 159-160. The Supreme Court of New York
has held that a duty of disclosure exists when a prospective employer learns
through a pre-employment physical of a job applicant's potentially life-threatening
condition. See 183 A.D.2d 563, 84 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Justice Saxe "see[s] no reason to
arrive at a different conclusion where a prospective insurer learns of a potentially
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and actual employees to submit to medical examinations are acting
in their own interest. 13 4 Both use the exam results to assess an individual's suitability, whether for employment or insurability purposes. 135 Employers use test results to exclude applicants from
jobs, much like insurance companies consider the exam results to
exclude life insurance applicants. 136 Clearly, no significant differences exist between the life insurance applicant and the employee
or prospective employee. 137 Unfortunately, the rights granted to
employees are not extended to insurance applicants, despite being
in apparently "comparable positions."'1 38 The reasons for this incongruity are uncertain. Life insurance companies should be held
139
to the same reasonable standard of care as employers.
life-threatening condition through a physical examination of a prospective insured."); Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 344 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
134 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 159-160.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 159-160. "No valid distinction can be made
between a prospective employer and prospective insurer who know of test results
indicating the presence of a potentially life-threatening medical condition in an
application, whether it be for a job or for an insurance policy." See also Petrosky,
718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 346 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
138 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 161.
139 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 159-160. McKinney reflects an entirely different basis for imposition of a duty on employers, distinct from the duty of an examining physician:
The failure to inform an employee or prospective employee that his
pre-employment physical has detected a serious medical condition
is an act of ordinary negligence with the experience of a trier of
fact. That... silence of the employer induced reliance by the plaintiff of his general good health an resulted in the failure to seek
treatment, to his obvious detriment, may be inferred. ....
The tendency of the averageperson, in similar circumstances, to interpret the
employer's silence as an indication of good health is so apparentand
the consequence of such reliance so potentially serious that we conclude that the law imposes a duty to disclose upon the employer. In
comparison with the harm to be abated, the burden placed upon the
employer is slight and promotes the public welfare [emphasis added]. 183 A.D.2d at 565-566.
The foregoing quote demonstrates that the duty discussed in McKinney was not
intended as an extension of the responsibilities of a physician hired by a third party
(in McKinney, an employer), but was rather based on the recognition a job applicant would assume that he would be informed by the employer if any test results
indicated the presence of an adverse medical condition. Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d
340, 345-346 (J. Saxe, dissenting). "Nothing in the discussion in McKinney supports the conclusion reached in Doe v. Prudentialthat imposition of a duty is only
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Perhaps the injudicious outcome in nondisclosure cases is due
to the fact that courts engage in a misguided analysis by focusing on
the presence or absence of a traditional physician-patient relationship. 140 Courts adhering to this rule embrace the traditional medical malpractice model, -holding the insurance company and the

underwriter immune from liability due to the non-existence of the
classic physician-patient relationship. The operative question
should be, whether the life insurance company, having discovered
the presence of an adverse medical condition based on the physi-

cian's findings, is under a duty to disclose the condition to the applicant.' 4 '

This

Note

acknowledges

that

no

doctor-patient

relationship exists between the applicant and the insurance company or the underwriter, but suggests imposition of a duty to act
with reasonable care based on common-law negligence principles.1 42 When the insurance company fails to disclose the existence
of an illness in a timely fashion, as a result the applicant suffers a
appropriate where the physical examination was conducted by a physician, thereby
,assuming a professional and expert position with respect to the insured's physical
condition and well-being.'" Id. at 346. The absence of a special relationship between the parties should not be dispositive; even if a special relationship can be
said to exist between employer and employee, McKinney applied its reasoning to
both employees and prospective employees, "and no special relationship can be
said to exist between a prospective employer and a mere job applicant." Id. The
situation between an employee and a prospective employee, and an insurer and
prospective insured are analogous-McKinney addressed the issue of the danger
to the public at large, and that reasoning should be extended to life insurance disclosure cases. Interview with Stephen Beldock, Attorney for Barbara Petrosky
with Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank (March 26, 2001).
140 See, e.g., Lodico, 129 A.D.2d 361 (holding that absence of physician-patient relationship prevents plaintiff from recovering from examining physician for
failure to diagnose brain tumor during disability examination); Ervin, 545 A.2d 354
(holding surgeon not liable for failure to diagnose and disclose cardiac disease pursuant to insurance exam because physician-patient relationship absent).
141
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 154-155
142 New Jersey, for example, has long recognized that a physician owes a duty
of reasonable care in the context of a third-party examination. See Neil J. Squillante, Expanding the Potential Tort Liability of Physicians: A Legal Portrait of
"NontraditionalPatients" and Proposalsfor Change, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1617. See
also Reed v. Bojarski, 166 N.J. 89, 764 A.2d 433 (2001) (holding that the substantive content of reasonable care in the third-party situation is dependent upon relevant negligence principles applied with appropriate public policy concerns; the
existence of a traditional doctor-patient relationship is therefore not necessary in
order to find the existence of a duty). See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7 (suggesting that courts reject the traditional medical malpractice model).
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reduced chance of survival or optimal recovery. 143 The courts' mistakenly indulge in a presumption that imposes no liability arising
from medical tests not performed for physician-patient diagnostic
purposes.
Since the life insurance company has assumed the act of evaluating their applicant's health status, it must be compelled to act with
care. 1 44 "[A] failure to disclose the existence of a known danger
may be the equivalent of a misrepresentation, where it is expected
that the other will rely upon the appearance of safety. '145 Throughout the law of torts, the causal connection between the wrongful
conduct and the resulting damage embraces misrepresentation in
the form of inducement of the plaintiff to act, or to refrain from
acting to his detriment. 146 If the insurance companies in Prudential,
Jackson, LoDico, Ervin, and Petrosky made appropriate disclosures, the applicant's probability of escaping some of the adverse
effects would have likely increased. Although the applicant is in
complete control of his or her physical health, the life insurance
company, nonetheless, has, in its exclusive possession, critical lifedeterminative information 47 which, under New York law, it is
48
under no legal obligation to disclose.
Arguably, applicants that have been rejected should be on notice that medical assistance should be sought. 149 Regardless, life insurance companies exclusively possess information that may save,
prolong, or increase the applicant's quality of life. 150 Many individuals, to their detriment, rely on silence as an indication of general
good health. 15 1 Authority exists which provides that silence can
mislead an examinee.1 52 An examinee generally assumes that "'no
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 154-155.
Hoover v. Williamson, 203 A.2d 863 (1964); Meinze v. Holmes, 532 N.E.2d
1, 173; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (A) (2000).
145
PROSSER, TORTS § 33 at 179 (4' ed. 1941).
146 PROSSER, TORTS § 108, at 714 (4 th ed. 1941).
147
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151.
148
See supra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
149
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151.
150 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151. See also Peace v. Weisman, 186 Ga. App.
697, 368 S.E.2d 319 (1988), where the dissent noted that "the only one left uninformed is the one most affected by the information."
151
McKinney, 183 A.D.2d at 566.
152
Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (1974) (reaffirming Hoover and
extending it to apply to physician's inaction, which, in the court's opinion, is com143
144

parable to express misrepresentation). See also Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Stapelton, 237 F.2d 229 (1956) (holding that by remaining silent, respondent per-
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news is good news and relies on the assumption that any serious
condition [would have been revealed]."'1 53 The rationale behind
such a duty to disclose is that once an insurance company elects to
provide a health examination, the examinee should be entitled to

rely "on the expectation that he would be told of any dangerous
condition actually disclosed by that examination. ' 15 4 In an effort to
prevent unwarranted assumptions of good health, it would therefore be appropriate for the law to provide that nondisclosure is tan155
tamount to misrepresentation.
Even those who suspect the existence of an adverse medical
condition may resist obtaining test results to avoid confronting the
possibility of unfavorable results. Moreover, some individuals may
lack the ability to make an informed decision regarding their health

due to external factors, much like Jane Doe, who neglected to fol-

low through on obtaining her test results for fear that she would
lose her child. 156 Since the consequences of such reliance by the
applicant are potentially serious, at a minimum, a definite legal
standard imposing a duty on the insurance company to disclose di157
agnostic conclusions should be adopted.

Additionally, imposing liability on the medical director, as well
as on the insurance company, for failing to disclose findings about
serious health dangers may be appropriate. While it is well-settled

that a physician-patient relationship is an essential element of a
cause of action based on medical malpractice, an action based on
simple negligence does not require such a relationship. 158 The
mitted movant to rely upon a tacit assurance of safety despite its knowledge of the
existence of a hidden health danger); Daly v. United States, 946 F.2d 1467-1470 (9 th
Cir. 1991) (remarking generally that an examinee reasonably may rely on a medical expert to warn of a known but hidden health danger).
153 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229, 232-233 (1956),
cited approvingly, Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 464 F. 2d 772
(1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064, 34 L. Ed. 2d 518, 93 S.Ct. 560 (1972).
154 237 F.2d 229. See also Daly v. United States, 946 F.2d 1467-1470 ( th Cir.
9
1991) (noting that the duty to disclose is not burdensome, and recognizes that examinees ".... justifiably [have] the reasonable expectation that [a medical expert]
will warn [the examinee] of any incidental dangers of which he is cognizant ...").
155 See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7 (insisting that hindering the facilitation of timely medical treatment offends the preservation of life).
156 860 F. Supp at 247.
157 See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7.
158 See Reed v. Life Care Inst., Inc, 166 N.J. 89, 764 A.2d 433 (2001) (despite
absence of traditional doctor-patient relationship, under ordinary rules of negligence, defendant physician had a nondelegable duty to conduct a reasonable, com-
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courts apply the narrow test of imposing liability only to treating or
examining physicians. 159 Such an interpretation is too restrictive
and fails to consider the realities of the relationship that arises,

however briefly, when a physician is exercising his or her professional skills in diagnosing another person. 60 Even though a physician's services, which include diagnosing, are rendered at the

request of a third party, the physician's duty to care for another
person is not eliminated or diminished. 161 A physician's duty extends not only to provide proper treatment, but to also make an
accurate diagnosis upon which treatment will be based. 162 Imposing liability on the life insurance provider is certainly appropriate
since the harm to the applicant proximately results from the physician's acts within the scope of his employment with the insurance
company.

63

petent examination, and this necessarily included making critical information
available to an examinee); McKinney v. Bellevue Hosp., 584 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992) (holding that doctors are liable for simple negligence in the absence of a physician-patient relationship); Hale v. State of New York 53 A.D.2d
1025 (1976); Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp. & Dispensary, 284 N.Y. 176 (1940);
Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hosp., 239 N.Y. 188 (1924). See also Morwin v. Albany
Hosp., 7 A.D.2d 582, amended, 8 A.D.2d 911 (1959). Liability in life insurance
disclosure cases should be predicated on a negligence theory, not the traditional
medical malpractice model. Interview with Stephen Beldock, Attorney for Barbara Petrosky with Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank (March 26, 2001).
159 LoDico, 129 A.D.2d 361 (Green, J., dissenting).
160
See id.; Twitchell v. MacKay, 78 A.D.2d 125, 128 (1980) (rejecting narrow
approach). See also Northon v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 731, 89 S.E.2d 809
(1955) ("Negligent failure to attend and treat [an individual] at a time when the
need of treatment is known to [a] physician and there is opportunity to apply
proper treatment amounts to the same as negligent treatment ..
"); Reed, 166
N.J. 89 (providing that the exact nature of the relationship is only a factor to be
considered.) The Reed court held that a physician is expected to exercise reasonable care commensurate with his experience and training, which involves communicating results to an examinee. The court further held that any reasonable person
would expect to be notified of a serious illness if it is discovered.
161 See Dubois v. Decker, 130 N.Y. 325 (1891) (no defense that no contractual
or employment relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant); LoDico, 129
A.D.2d at 364.
162 See Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209 (1898) (noting that physician is
under obligation to use his best judgment in exercising his skill and applying his
knowledge); LoDico, 129 A.D.2d at 364.
163 Though a physician is bound independently by the ethical code of the
medical profession, the life insurance medical director is an employee of the company since the insurance company exercises control over the administrative aspects
of the director's work life. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 223, cmt. a
(physicians can be employees if the factors suggest an employment relationship).

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

72
B.

[Vol. XVIII

Expansion of Disclosure of Medical Conditions

In addition to the HIV virus, the insurance applicant can possess serious adverse medical conditions which pose equally detrimental risks to the individual if left untreated. 164 Such conditions
include heart disease, various forms of cancer, and impaired liver
and kidney functions. 165 The existence of transmittable illnesses
such as tuberculosis and hepatitis also expose third parties to
harm.' 66 Mandatory disclosure legislation applied to one particular
medical condition is insufficient to protect the health interests of
the insurance applicant and the populace. 67 Expansion of disclosure legislation should encompass all adverse medical conditions.

IV.

HEALTH RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH
NONMANDATORY DISCLOSURE

A.

Loss of Treatment Time

A life insurance company's failure to inform an applicant that
he or she is suffering from a condition that requires medical atten-

tion results in loss of critical treatment time.

68

For example, the

See also Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 157 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1945) (noting that
even though the corporation employed a physician primarily to protect its interests, the court applied the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold the corporation
accountable; the court concluded that even when an employer hires a physician
solely for the employer's benefit, the employer is liable for any injury causation
sustained through the physician acting as the employer's agent.); Mracheck v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E.2d 801 (1954) (holding that physician
employed solely for company's benefit is a servant); Betesh v. United States, 400 F.
Supp. 238 (1974) (finding that the physician was the employer's agent, and thus,
the employer was liable for the failure to disclose). But see Thomas v. Keeton, 425
So.2d 396 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that physicians who examine employees
wholly for the benefit of employers have no duty to disclose medical conditions);
Tomko v. Comprehensive Imaging, Inc., 412 Pa. Super. 54 (1.992) (no duty of care
arose when defendant physician allegedly misread X-ray in the course of a preemployment examination).
164 See, e.g., Petrosky, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281 (applicant unsuspectingly suffered
from severe and extensive atherosclerotic disease); supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
165 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 162 (delineating health conditions that could
potentially effect applicant's mortality).
166 For a comprehensive discussion on these conditions, see infra notes 189208 and accompanying text.
167 See infra notes 168-188 and accompanying text.
168 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 148-149.
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169
lab results of a life insurance examination can reveal cancer.
170
Blood counts may reveal the existence of a cellular malignancy.
A positive prognosis results only from timely oncologic treatment. 171 Many forms of cancer are curable in their early stages with
surgery alone. 17 2 Radiation and drug therapy also play a key role in
the cure of early stage cancers.' 73 Delay in treatment is the most

74
prevalent poor prognostic factor.'
Diabetes Mellitus is a syndrome caused by an insulin supply

and demand imbalance. 75 It is characterized by elevated blood
sugar and associated with abnormal carbohydrate, fat, and protein
metabolism. 176 Immediate medical care is essential to ensure effectiveness of treating the condition. 177 Complications of the illness
increase with late treatment. 178 Late clinical diagnosis can lead to
169 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 136.
170

THE MERCK MANUAL (1 6th ed. 1995) at 1273 [hereinafter, MERCK MAN-

UAL]. Some of the more routine tests such as the Complete Blood Count (CBC)
Differential do not test for specific types of cancer, but indicate the presence of an
abnormality.

See generally

JOYCE

M. BLACK & ESTER MATASSARIN-JACOBS,

CLINICAL MANAGEMENT FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, at 556 (5th ed. 1997) [herein-

after, CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE].
171 See generally MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, Chapter 103-Oncology.
172 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 1276. The five-year survival rates for
cancer cured by surgery alone include: cervix (94%), breast (82%), bladder
(81%), colon (81%), prostate (80%), larynx (76%), endometirum (74%), ovary
(72%), oral cavity (67-76%), kidney (67%), testis (65%), and lung (non-small cell,
stage 1) (50-70%). Id.
173 Id. at 1276-1281. Forms of cancer which respond particularly well to radiation, if detected early, are Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, Hodgkin's Disease, and
Prostate cancer. The five year disease-free rate for these forms of cancer treated
by radiation therapy are 90%, 88%, and 84%, respectively. Drug therapy is highly
effective for curing malignancies in its early stages of Hodgkin's Disease (74% 5
yr. disease-free rate), testicular cancer (88% 5 yr. disease-free rate), and choriocarcinoma (all stages, 95% 5 yr. disease-free rate). Id. at 1286.
174 See id. at 1275.
175 See generally id., Ch. 91-Disorders of Carbohydrate Metabolism;
supra note 170, at 1955.
CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1955.

CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE,

176

177 See generally, MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, Chapter 91-Disorders of
Carbohydrate Metabolism. Treatment regimens effective in keeping glucose fluctuations normal include plasma-glucose monitoring, insulin treatment, and diet
management. See also CLINICAL MGT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170,
at 1965, 1968-1970.
178 CLINICAL MGT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1109-1125.
When the condition is undiagnosed, diabetes is the third leading cause of death
from disease in the United States. Even when it is not fatal, diabetes can cause
major disabilities. In the United States, diabetes mellitus is the single greatest contributor to blindness in adults, end-stage renal failure, and nontraumatic amputa-
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the development of specific forms of renal, ocular, neurologic, and
179
cardiovascular complications.
The most effective method to prevent impaired cardiac function is reduction of primary risk factors. 180 Prognosis is poor unless
the individual is subjected to aggressive reduction of cholesterol
levels through dietary and exercise treatment, supplemented with
medication as necessary.' 8 ' Individuals afflicted with certain cardiovascular disorders may not experience symptoms particular to the
disease. 182 In this situation, the insurance company possesses exclusive control over information that may save the life of the applicant.
Failure to impose a duty to apprise the applicant that he or she is at
risk for development or exacerbation of a cardiac disorder, particularly those that are characteristically silent, is intolerable.
The screening procedure also tests the cholesterol levels of the
applicant.' 8 3 Abnormally high lipid levels can lead to the development of coronary heart disease and metabolic diseases of the liver,
if not timely reduced to normal values. 84 With lowered cholesterol, an individual drastically decreases the probability of developtions; it is also a risk factor in coronary artery disease and stroke. See CLINICAL
MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1955.
179 Late clinical complications that can result from untimely treatment include kidney damage, sensory defects, skin tissue deterioration, debilitating pain,
and vision damage which can lead to blindness. See CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170 at 1992-2000.
180 See generally, MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 411 (reversible risk factors include hypercholesterolemia, hypertension, cigarette smoking, obesity, and
physical inactivity).
181 Id. at 412. Continued treatment with Digoxin reduces the risk of developing worsening cardiac disorders when administered early in the course of the illness, as evidenced by reduced heart failure-related hospitalizations, instances of
emergency care, and the need for concomitant cardiac therapy. In a double-blind
placebo-controlled study of 6,801 patients, Digoxin was associated with a 25% reduction in the number of hospitalizations for heart failure, a 28% reduction in the
risk of a patient having at least one hospitalization for heart failure, and a 6.5%
reduction in total hospitalizations. This trend was evident in subgroups of patients
with mild heart conditions as well as more severe diseases. See PHYSICIAN'S DESK
REFERENCE, at 1153 (1999).
182 Coronary heart disease, hypertension, congestive heart failure, pulmonary
edema, pericarditis, dysrythmias, tachycardia, and artherosclerosis are among the
cardiac conditions that can develop in the absence of symptoms. See CLINICAL
MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170 at 411, 417, 451, 488, 501, 521,
and 563.
183 See Middleton, supra, note 24.
184 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1220,
1895.
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ing one of these medical conditions. 185 Again, the individual who
has elevated cholesterol levels may be asymptomatic, 186 and may
therefore delay receiving necessary treatment.
Although New York currently imposes a duty on the prospective insurer to inform an applicant that he or she is infected with the
HIV virus, before 1990,187 applicants infected with the virus lost
valuable treatment time. The health status of insurance applicants
unsuspectingly afflicted with the disease in the twenty-eight other
states that have refused to impose such a duty is currently deteriorating. Studies have shown that early medication/medicinal therapy
can delay the course of the virus and improve quality of life. 188 Indisputably, the dangers inherent in delaying treatment time can no
longer be ignored.
B.

Health Risks to Others

Currently, third parties in other jurisdictions are unknowingly
being exposed to the HIV virus due to the life insurance company's
failure to disclose an applicant's infected status. 189 Although New
York has appropriately reduced the spread of the HIV virus
through mandatory disclosure legislation, the failure to disclose an
applicant's medical condition can result in additional health risks to
third parties.
185 Id. at 1241 (noting that reduction of fatty acids, increased physical activity,
and medication monitoring have proven extremely successful in preventing cholesterol-induced disorders).
186 Id. at 1241 (remarking that atherosclerosis is typically well advanced when
clinical manifestations develop). Often, manifestations of coronary heart disease
do not appear until the coronary artery is narrowed by 75%. Id. at 1244.
187 In response to the growing prevalence of AIDS, NY Ins. L. § 2611 was
enacted in 1990 in an effort to protect the rights of those infected. See KAMEN &
TOPPE-rA, supra note 22; Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. at 491
(Frank Deramus learned he was HIV positive eighteen months after the insurance
company discovered the condition).
188 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 83. Zidovudine (ZDU) has increased
the median survival rate severalfold.

189 Frank Deramus continually put his wife at risk while the couple attempted
to conceive a child. See Greenwald, supra note 7 (telephone interview with Jody
Deramus, wife of Frank Deramus (November 15, 1996)). See also 860 F. Supp 243.
Jane Doe's husband contracted the virus through unprotected sexual intercourse.
In addition, her baby was exposed to the virus each time she nursed. Jane's husband has since tested positive for the virus.
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The life insurance exam may include screenings for tuberculosis and hepatitis. 190 Prompt use of effective antituberculous medication is the most effective means of limiting transmission.1 91
Infection is virtually almost airborne, 192 and thus, is communicable
at an alarmingly high rate. 193 Although the course of the illness
varies among individuals, individuals infected with the bacterial virus will likely suffer from persistent cough, fever, compromised immune system, and unresolved pneumonia. 194 Once infection is
established, clinical tuberculosis may develop within months, or it
may be delayed for years. 95 Tuberculosis may be fatal if not
196
treated appropriately.
Simply stated, hepatitis is an inflammation of the liver.1 97 The
presence of antibodies in the blood denotes (1) previous or resolving infection, (2) a continuing chronic infection, or (3) immunization from hepatitis vaccine.' 98 Transmission of hepatitis can occur
through person-to-person contact. 199 The virus has a high infectivity rate.2 00 Symptoms of viral hepatitis include flu-like illness, jaundice, malaise, and liver failure.20 1 Hepatitis, when left untreated,
often results in the development of chronic active hepatitis, often
leading to destruction of the liver. 20 2 Aplastic anemia is a further
20 3
complication of acute viral hepatitis with a high mortality rate.
Currently, no treatment exists to reverse the condition.2 0 4 IndividuMiddleton, supra note 24; Greenwald, supra note 7 at 136.
MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 131; CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 159 at 1143.
192 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1140
(describing how, in nearly all instances, infection is acquired by inhalation by a
receptive host).
MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 131.
193
194 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1141,
1142.
195
MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 131.
196 Office of Technology Assessment, United States Congress, The Continuing Challenge of Tuberculosis (1993).
197 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1861.
198 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1865.
199 Spread of the virus occurs through contact with blood and bodily fluids.
MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 900-901.
200 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 900-901.
MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 902.
201
202
CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1865.
Hepatitis B develops into chronic hepatitis if left untreated in 1 in 10 persons. Id.
at 1865.
203 Id. at 1869.
204
Id.
190

191
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als who are otherwise healthy usually recover from Hepatitis A. 20 5
However, in the absence of treatment Hepatitis A may develop into
fulminant hepatitis, which resembles acute liver failure. 206 Fulminant hepatitis causes severe illness and even death. 20 7 Given the

serious health risks that tuberculosis and hepatitis poses to third
parties, an insurance company should be mandated to inform the
208
local board of health in an effort to advance infection control.

V.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ENACTING STATE
DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION

A.

Risk Utility Formula

The tort of negligence imposes a legal duty to act as a reasonable person, guided by ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs. 20 9 Conduct that falls below this standard for
the protection against others against unreasonable risk or harm results in liability.2 10 The reasonable person, Justice Learned Hand
postulates, takes a precaution against injury if the burden in doing
so is less than the loss if the injury occurs multiplied by the
probability that the injury will occur.2 11 The formula is suggestive
of the appropriate balancing process one should employ when engaging in risk-creating conduct. 2 12 This risk-utility formula gives
significance and meaning to the concept of "reasonableness" into a
205
206
207

Id.

210

Id.

211
212

See R. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
Id.

Id. at 1865.
The fulminant hepatitis mortality rate is 90-100%. See id. at 1867
208 Five states, including New York, have over half of the new tuberculosis
cases. See Reynolds v. Goord, 103 F. Supp. 2d 316 (2000). In response to the
highly infectious nature of the disease, public health departments have regulations
that may be enforced in the event of nonadherence to treatment. In March 1993,
New York enacted legislation empowering the city health commissioner to detain
those infected with tuberculosis who failed to follow an appropriate course of
treatment. See New York City Health Code, 24 RCNY § 11.47 (1993). See also
Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth C. Lovoy, Something Old, Something New: The
Challenge of Tuberculosis Control in the Age of AIDS, 42 BUFF. L. REV. at 744
(1994). For a discussion regarding the resurgence of the tuberculosis epidemic in
New York City, see generally, Carlos A. Ball & Mark Barnes, Public Health and
Individual Rights: Tuberculosis Control and Detention Procedures in New York
City, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 38 (1994).
209 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 ( 6 t ed. 1990).
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framework which, "if followed will bring about the . . .efficient,
'2 13
cost-justified level of accidents and safety.
Application of this formula, balancing the relevant facts of the
cases previously discussed, convincingly suggests that life insurance
companies should inform their applicants of the results of their
medical examinations. 214 According to this theory, to determine
whether an individual owes a duty to another, the interplay of three
factors must be considered: (1) the probability that harm will occur
if no precautions are taken, (2) the magnitude of the injury if the
harm occurs, and (3) the burden of taking precautions that would
prevent the accident. 21 5 "If the probability be called, P; the injury,
L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than
''216
L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL.
If the variables are contextualized, it becomes obvious that insurance disclosure legislation is most cost-justified. 217 The likelihood that exacerbation of illness or death of the ailing applicant
will occur (P) is very high, as the individual who is unaware of an
adverse medical condition will remedy the illness with inattention. 21 8 The resulting injuries (L) are among the greatest magnitude, since aggravation of medical conditions, the possible
infections of third parties, or death could result. 219 Lastly, the burden (B) on the life insurance company is comparatively insignificant; 220 it would mandate only the issuance of a letter apprising the
applicant of any troubling findings. 22' Since twenty-eight states
have enacted statutes to this effect, disclosure is clearly not disproId.
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151-153.
215 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
216 Id. at 173.
217 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 153.
218 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151-153.
219 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151-153.
220 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151-153; infra notes 256-271 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents University of California, 551 P.2d 334,
213
214

342 (Cal. 1976) (enunciating the rule that where a psychiatrist determines that a
warning is essential to avert danger arising from the psychological condition of his
patient, he or she incurs a legal obligation to warn). The basis for this decision was
the court's belief that we live in an "interdependent" and "risk-infected" society,
and members of such a society cannot tolerate exposure to additional risks that
could be averted by a simple act of communication. Id. at 347.
221 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152 (suggesting similar solution for federal
insurance disclosure legislation).
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portionately burdensome. 222 Because of the significant risks that a
policy of nondisclosure presents to the applicant, coupled with the
minor burden mandatory disclosure imposes on the life insurance
company, a legal duty to make appropriate disclosures should be
223
obligatory.
B.

Policy Considerations in Favor of Finding a Duty of Care

The case law presented in this Note briefly referenced important considerations of policy. The Prudential court stated that the
"duty element in a negligence action is merely 'an expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say
that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.' 2 24 Such policy considerations that courts recognize are the foreseeability of harm, the connection between the offending party's conduct and the injury
suffered, moral blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the offender, and the consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.2 2 5 Despite recognizing these policy considerations,
the courts have presumptively concluded that a duty of disclosure
did not exist without adequately considering the intermingling of
these factors. 226 As previously discussed, the foreseeability and
likelihood that an individual suffering from a latent medical condition will not procure medical attention to prevent further worsening
of the condition or take the necessary precautions in an effort to
222 The twenty-eight states which currently require insurance company disclosure are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, New York (only HIV results), North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Greenwald, supra note 7, at 132.
223 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153.
224 860 F. Supp. 243, 251 (quoting Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527,
515 A.2d 756 (1986) quoting, PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53 at 358
(5th ed. 1984)).
225 See 860 F. Supp. at 251 (quoting Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v. United
States Gypsum Co., 556 A.2d 1126 (1989) in which the court quoted Tarasoff v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal.); 944 F. Supp. 488, 496. See generally Craddock v. Gross,
504 A.2d 1300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("a question of whether a defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff, and in negligence cases, the
duty is always the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in
the light of the apparent risk.").
226 See Greenwald, supra note 7.
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reduce the infectivity to third parties is significantly high. 227 The
insurance company's failure to disclose is inseparable from the
harm suffered by the applicant. 228 The resultant injury should not
refer to the initial contraction or development of the medical condition, but rather the deterioration of the applicant's medical condi229
tion and the failure to safeguard third parties from contagions.
Undoubtedly, a connection exists between the aggravated health
condition of the individual and nondisclosure by the insurance company. 230 Additionally, mandatory disclosure legislation benefits the
community. 231 Such benefits include the facilitation of timely medical treatment for sick individuals, the protection of healthy individuals from infection, and the attainment of an interest in one's
personal medical information. 2 32 The benefits of the community
clearly outweigh any insignificant burden placed on the life insur233
ance company.
VI.

RECOMMENDATION:

MANDATED NEW YORK

STATUTORY LEGISLATION

A.

Elements of a State Statute Regulating Insurance Disclosure

To ensure that an individual's interest in their medical information is fully realized, mandatory life insurance disclosure legislation
must be adopted. While New York mandates HIV test disclosure,
state residents who suffer from non-HIV medical conditions must
also be afforded protection.234 If such legislation were enacted, the
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 153-154.
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 153-154.
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 153-154.
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 154-155.
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 155.
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 155.
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 155.
234
See, e.g., Petrosky, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Saxe, J., dissenting, noting that there
is no reason to infer that the legislature intended that a duty of disclosure should
not extend upon insurers to disclose any other type of test result. Rather, in enacting 28 NY Ins. L. § 2611(c), "the Legislature was merely focusing its attention on
the ongoing effort toward preventing the spread of a contagious, deadly illness,
which effort requires large-scale, society-wide actions. It did not preclude the
courts from imposing a similar duty in other types of circumstances."); 718
N.Y.S.2d 340, 347. The model statute proposed in the APPENDIX is broad enough
to include all adverse medical conditions. New Jersey has also imposed a narrow,
limited duty on insurance companies to make disclosures. N.J.A.A. 17:23A-13.1
compels a life insurance company to disclose any communicable diseases discovered during an examination. This statute fails to protect those applicants who suf227
228
229
230
231
232
233
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unfortunate result in Petrosky, and in similar cases, could have been
avoided.
Currently, Congress is considering insurance disclosure legislation that will regulate the manner in which insurance companies
present potentially life-saving information. 235 However, nothing
prevents New York State from enacting its own state regulation
policies without delay. 236 In essence, the McCarran-Ferguson Act

2 37
gives supremacy to state regulation of the business of insurance.
Appended to this Note is a proposed model insurance disclosure statute. 238 The statute was drafted in an attempt to address the
critical issues raised, and to minimize the ambiguity confronted by
the courts in their attempt to determine the extent of the insurer's
duty. In general, the proposed legislation should require that the
results of the medical examination be communicated to the applicant, or to a designee. 239 The proposed legislation should also permit insurance applicants to obtain their medical information
regardless of whether they have been denied coverage or offered

coverage at a higher premium.

240

Furthermore, the applicant

fer from uncommunicable medical conditions. See Nolan, 784 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super.
2001) (In this case, the life insurance applicant unknowingly possessed liver cancer
at the time of examination. Though the test results indicated elevated levels of two
liver enzymes, First Colony did not disclose the results of the blood test-the applicant died two years later.).
235 Congress has the authority to enact such insurance disclosure legislation.
In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson-Act (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994)).
236 In Section 1011 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress stated the underlying policy of the statute as one favoring state regulation of insurance:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such business by the several States.
237 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. For a discussion of the statute, its history, and its
interpretation, see Linda M. Lent, McCarran-Ferguson in Perspective, 48 INS.
COUNSEL J. 411 (1981).
238 See APPENDIX. The proposed statute was modeled after the Medical Privacy in the Age of New Technologies Act (H.R. 1815, 105 t' Cong. 2) and Section
2611 of the New York Insurance Law.
239 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 153 (asserting that because of the relatively
minor burden disclosure imposes and the significant risks to life that a policy of
nondisclosure represents, insurance companies should have a legal duty to
disclose).
240 See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7 (arguing vigorously that critical
medical information must reach the concerned applicant in all circumstances); Pe-
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should be entitled to this information even if approved for coverage.2 4 1 In the event the life insurance company discloses the existence of an unfavorable medical condition, the company should
inform the individual of the location of local medical facilities and
2 42
provide references to suitable professionals.

The proposal should also provide the applicant with remedies
in the event his or her rights are violated. 243 The statute should

prescribe civil sanctions for persons who have failed to comply with
the statute.2 44 The statute must ensure that an infringement on an
24 5
individual's rights will not be ignored or disregarded.

B.

Imposition of Insurance Company Standard Practice to
Apprise Applicant of Possible Adverse
Medical Conditions

In comparison to the harm to be abated in favor of the applicant, the burden placed upon the life insurance company is slight
and promotes the public welfare. 2 46 The insurance company can

simply include in their rejection letter that the medical tests inditrosky v. Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 283 (respondent insurance company offered
coverage at a higher premium without disclosing medical exam results).
241 See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7.
242 Some have urged that when an insurer is the source of an adverse test
result, the insurer should be responsible for suggesting counseling thereafter, since
this may be the first time the individual becomes aware of his or her medical status. See Ralph C. Ferrara & L. Lance Cole, Marketing FinancialPlanningServices:
Overcoming the Regulatory Hurdles for Insurance Companies, 5 Journal of Ins.
Regulation 439-440 (1987).
243 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153.
244 In finding that "health information plays a vital role in every aspect of an
individual's life [and] includes some of the most sensitive information available
about an individual," the drafters of the Medical Privacy in the Age of New Technologies Act sought to provide individuals with access to their medical records.
H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. 2 (1997). The drafters of the Act remedied non-compliance through civil sanctions. The Act prescribes civil sanctions for persons who
have "materially failed to comply with the provisions of the Act." H.R. 1815, 301.
If the violations occur with such frequency that they constitute a general business
practice, the Act increases the punishment. Id., 311.
245 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 167 (supporting the Medical Privacy in the
Age of New Technologies Act (HR 1815, 105 th Cong. 2 (1997)), which, like the
notification provision provided for in this Note, recognizes an individual's interest
in his or her own personal medical information).
246 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153. "Such a duty could be satisfied with
only a minimal effort, and does not impose an onerous burden on the insurance
industry." Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 343 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
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cated that that applicant may be afflicted with a condition that requires immediate attention. 2 47 The letter should not state the
applicant's illness or medical condition; instead, the letter should
offer to release the results to a physician who can more appropriately explain the significance of the test results.2 48 The letter should
also delineate a list of the tests performed, as well as an explanation
of the procedure by which the applicant could have the insurance
company disclose the results directly to his or her primary care physician.2 49 If the applicant does not respond, affirmative steps should
be taken by a representative of the insurance company to speak
personally with the applicant. Should the applicant persist in refusing to have the information disclosed, it would be advantageous for
the insurance company to obtain a written release, if possible, to
25 0
establish that the insurance company has fulfilled its duty.
Insurance companies may oppose notifying the applicant of
any discovered medical conditions, contending that the insurance
company is not a doctor, and is therefore not expected to protect
life and limb.2 5 1 It is the position of the American Council for Life
Insurance that "it is not appropriate for insurance companies to deliver the bad news.12 5 2 However, this Note is entirely consistent
with the notion that it would be unsuitable for the insurance company to espouse the role of physician. 253 The Meinze court specifically held that a duty to communicate can be satisfied by delivering
a written report to the applicant's treating physician.2 54 Thus,
247 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153; Nolan, 784 A.2d 81, 90 ("The Duty of
disclosure could be fully discharged by the simple expedient of sending all ... test
results to all policy applicants with a form letter suggesting that they should consult
their physicians regarding any [abnormalities.]").
248 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153.
249 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153.
250 The extent of the duty to disclose has been disputed, and is thus, uncertain. See, e.g., 860 F. Supp. 243; 944 F. Supp. 488; 695 N.Y.S.2d 281.
251 See e.g., 944 F. Supp at 493. The court stated that such a heightened duty
of care and disclosure is required only from physicians who have "sworn to protect
and respect human life." Id. In addition the court remarked that "an insurance
company should [not] bear the same burden of care as a physician, i.e., divulging
the results of a medical examination." Id.
252 Telephone interview with Ginny Bueno, Spokeswoman for the American
Council of Life Insurance (June 23, 1997). Greenwald, supra, note 7, at 167.
253 Greenwald, supra, note 7, at 152-153, (acknowledging position of American Council of Life Insurance, but nevertheless advocating for disclosure). See
supra notes 258, 259 and accompanying text
254 40 Ohio App. 3d at 148.
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neither the potential insurer, nor the company's underwriter would
be compelled to personally inform the applicant of his or her medi2
cal status.

55

A further perspective of the insurance company may be that
the burden of potential liability resulting from a negligent misdiagnosis would undermine the ability of insurance providers to utilize
such examinations to accept or reject an applicant. 256 Physicians
employed by the insurance company would also likely find disclosure disagreeable due to the possibility that misdiagnosis may stimulate litigation. 257 Nevertheless, the social utility of disclosure

outweighs the burden such potential liability would place on the
insurance company or the underwriter. 258 To lessen the burden of

potential liability on the insurance company, the proposed legislation could impose a lesser degree of liability of the insurer, requiring gross negligence, not simple negligence, as an antecedent to an
actionable claim.2 5 9 An unmistakable public policy exists favoring
See supra notes 257-260 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Martinez v. Lewis, 969 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1998) (affirming similar
position in the context of auto insurance medical examinations). Stephen Beldock,
Attorney for Barbara Petrosky, suggests that the insurance company could avoid
such liability if they stated in their notification letter that they are solely providing
the information obtained from the medical examination, and would thus implore
the applicant to obtain a second opinion from his or her primary care physician.
Interview with Stephen Beldock, Attorney for Barbara Petrosky with Birbrower,
Montalbano, Condon & Frank (March 26, 2001).
257
See, e.g. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 205 (Alaska 1995) (holding that
emotional distress resulting from a misdiagnosis of AIDS is foreseeable and actionable); Todd Neidlich, Suits by Patients Surge in Misdiagnosing AIDS Cases,
NAT'L L.J. at A12 (1995) (discussing recent cases involving the litigation of HIV
false-positive misdiagnosis and stating that "dozens of such suits are active around
the country"). No case to date has been found confronting the issue of a physician's duties and liabilities to a person examined pursuant to a life insurance contract, but the Hoover court (see supra note 144, citing this case for the proposition
that the life insurance company must be compelled to act with care) has suggested
an analogy between such a case and a case involving pre-employment examination.
See J.P. Ludington, Physician'sDuties and Liabilities to Person Examined Pursuant
to Physician's Contract with Such Person's Prospective or Actual Employer or Insurer, 10 A.L.R.3d 1071 (2000).
258
See supra notes 209-233 and accompanying text.
259
As Prosser explains:
Most courts consider that gross negligence falls short of a reckless
disregard of the consequences, and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind. There is, in short, not generally accepted meaning; but the probability is, when the phrase is
used, that it signifies more than ordinary inadvertence or inatten255
256
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260
the preservation of life over the solvency of insurance companies.

The balancing of the burdens and benefits of disclosure undoubtedly results in favoring the imposition of a duty to disclose on life
261
insurance companies.

VII.

"THE CIVIL RIGHTS BATTLE OF THE NEXT

CENTURY"

'262

As new advances in biomedical science are reshaping our un263
derstanding of human genetics and the delivery of health care,
the tests used in the underwriting process 264 have been correspond265
ingly modernized as insurers attempt to further minimize risk.
Genetic testing, in particular, can indicate if a person is a carrier of
tion, but less perhaps that conscious indifference to the
consequences.
PROSSER AND KEETON, Handbook on Torts 212 ( 51h ed. 1984).
In the context of municipal liability, for example, gross negligence, not negligence
alone, is required as a basis for liability. See, e.g., Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S.
257, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 94 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1987) (noting that deliberate indifference or
reckless disregard is required to hold a municipality liable).
260 In Northon v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 731 (89 S.E.2d 809) (1955), the
court recognized certain public policy considerations and held: "The duty of a
physician . . . to bring skill and care to the amelioration of the condition of [an
examinee] arises not only from the implied contract between physician and patient, but such duty also has its foundation in public considerationswhich are inseparablefrom the nature and exercise of his calling and is predicated by the law on the
relation which exists between physician and patient which is a result of a consensual transaction, and not necessarily one of contract (emphasis added). See also
Peace v. Weisman, 186 Ga. App. 697, 368 S.E.2d 319 (1988) (Dean, J., dissenting,
remarking that given the realities of an examiner/examinee situation, public policy
demands imposing a duty of disclosure. To hold otherwise "denies a remedy for a
wrong, fosters irresponsibility on the part of ... consulting physicians, and may
allow [depriving] a human being of a fighting chance to live").
261 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153.
262 Statement of Rep. Cliff Sterns, Technological Advances in Genetic
Testing: Implications for the Future, 1996: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the
Subcomm. on Tech. of the House Comm. on Science, 10 4th Cong. 4 (1996)
(addressing concerns of potential abuse resulting from access to genetic tests in the
insurance context).
263 NIH/DOE Working Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of
Human Genome Research, Genetic Information and Health Insurance, Report of
the Task Force on Genetic Information and Insurance, at 1 (1993).
264 See supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the underwriting process.
265 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 136.
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a mutated 266 gene, and therefore, determine if an individual may be
predisposed or presymptomatic for a particular disease.2 67 As a re-

sult of this advanced technology, insurance companies will soon
have the ability to identify individuals with predispositions to particular diseases, and thereby, more accurately and readily determine the probability that an applicant's longevity will be
reduced. 268 Some believe that this encourages life insurance companies to discriminate2 69 against those individuals with predispositions to disease. 270 This has fueled controversy regarding the
underwriting process.2 71 Specifically, opponents assert that genetic

testing in the life insurance industry provides the potential for
abuse.2 72 In contrast, the insurance industry asserts that a proscripA mutation is a change in a gene potentially capable of being transmitted
t
( 1 6 h ed.
1989) [hereinafter, TABER'S].
267 See Christopher M. Keefer, Bridging the Gap Between Life Insurer and
Consumer in the Genetic Testing Era: The RF Proposal,74 IND. L.J. 1375 (1999).
268 Chetan Gulati, Genetic Antidiscrimination Laws in Health Insurance: A
Misguided Solution, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 149 (2001).
269 "Genetic discrimination" has been defined as "the denial of rights, privileges or opportunities on the basis of information obtained from genetically-based
diagnostic and prognostic tests." Larry Gostin, The Human Genome Initiativeand
the Impact of Genetic Testing and Screening Technologies: The Use of Genetically
Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests By Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J. L.
AND MED. 109 (1991). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Telles v.
Commissionerof Insurance, 574 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 1991) defined "unfair discrimination" in the context of insurance as "that which treats individuals of the same
class and equal expectation of life differently." 574 N.E.2d at 361-362.
270 See Bryce A. Lenox, Genetic Discrimination in Insurance and Employment: Spoiled Fruits of the Human Genome Project, 23 DAYTON L. REV. 189, 191
(1997); Schneider, supra note 286, at 377, 378 (noting that genetic discrimination
by insurers may result in denied insurance, limitations in coverage, or higher premiums for coverage).
271 See generally, Proceedings of the InternationalSymposium on Law and
Science at the Crossroads: Biomedical Technology, Ethics, Public Policy, and the
Law: What Should Be the Role of State and Federal Government in Regulating
Genetic Data?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1547 (1993) [hereinafter, INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM]. Compare Carol Lee, Creating a Genetic Underclass: The Potential
for Genetic Discriminationby the Health Insurance Industry, 13 PACE L. REV. 189
(1993), with Roberta B. Meyer, InternationalSymposium on Law and Science at
the Crossroads: Biomedical Technology, Ethics, Public Policy, and the Law: Justification for Permitting Life Insurers to Continue to Underwrite on the Basis of Genetic Information and Genetic Test Results, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1271 (1993).
272 See Lenox, supra note 270, at 190, and see Keefer, supra note 267, at 1387
(both describing a case in which a mother was denied life insurance for her two
children because one was afflicted with Hurler Syndrome. The rejection letter
266

to offspring. See TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1163
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tion of the use of genetic testing in the underwriting process could
have adverse effects on the industry as a whole. 2 73
The Human Genome Initiative 2 74 ("HGI") is a congressional
effort aimed at identifying and sequencing every human gene in an
effort to "decode" the genome 75 and apply that knowledge to adstated that the child was denied coverage because the condition is fatal, but failed
to address the reason for denying coverage to the unafflicted child). Similarly, a
1996 survey of 332 people in families at risk for a genetic disease found that 25%
believed that either they or a family member were unfairly refused life insurance.
Lenox, supra note 270, at 194. Another study found that people who were at risk
for genetic disease and were classified as standard risk refused to get tested, because they believed that their insurance would be denied if the results came back
positive for the disease. Lisa N. Geller, Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Genetic Discrimination: A Case Study Analysis, 2 Sci. & ENGINEERING
ETHICS 71, 79 (1996). In addition, "the fact that certain genetic diseases are often
associated with specific ethnic or racial groups such as African Americans (e.g.,
sickle cell disease), Ashkenazi Jews (e.g., Bloom's Syndrome, adult form Gaucher's
disease, Tay-Sachs disease), or Armenians (e.g., Familial Mediterranean Fever) increases the potential for invidious discrimination." Gostin, supra note 269, at 111.
See also Marvin R. Natowicz, Genetic Discriminationand the Law, 50 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 465 (1992) (explaining how "the practice of genetic discrimination has
the potential of creating a new group of disadvantaged people who will need the
same protections now accorded those suffering from race and sex discrimination").
273
Id., at 197; Meyer, supra note 271, at 1273 (asserting that a denial of the
right to underwrite on the basis of all medical information would prevent insurance industry survival). See also infra notes 306-313 for further examination of the
position of the life insurance industry.
274 Officially starting October 1, 1989, the HGI is a joint venture primarily
involving the National Institute of Health and the United States Department of
Energy. Jendusa, infra note 276 at 172. The project is scheduled to last fifteen
years, and cost and estimated three billion dollars. Id., at 172-173; Lee, supra note
271, at 195. The goal of the project is to map and sequence the structure of all
human genes, which includes disease-causing genes hidden within the DNA structure. Lee, supra note 271 at 195. The HGI is intended to identify the estimated
80,000 genes existing in human DNA, and determine the sequences of the 3 billion
chemical base pairs that compromise human DNA. This detailed information, it is
expected, "will be the key to understanding the structure, organization, and function of DNA in chromosomes." Jendusa, infra note 276 at 175, 176. The HGI is
expected to enhance the ability to identify and individual's predisposition to genetic disease, which may effectively facilitate intervention procedures to prevent
and treat genetic disorders. Id. For a detailed history of the HGI, see Robert
Mullon Cook-Degan, Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 RISK, HEALTH,
SAFETY, & ENV'T 97 (1994).
275 The human genome is defined as "all the information stored in a complete
strand of human DNA." See Jeremy A. Colby, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed by the 1 05th Congress, 24 AM. J. L. AND MED. 443 (1998);
Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/UnfairDiscrimination Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 Ky. L. J. 503, 521 (1997).
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vance the scientific and medical community. 276 As a result of the
HGI, scientists will be able to identify increasingly greater number
of genetic dispositions and diseases of the human body. 277 This
knowledge allows for the detection 278 of genetic sequences that
cause disease, which life insurers can use as a basis for declination
of coverage. 279 Currently, genetic tests can indicate predispositions
to discrete conditions, such as cystic fibrosis,280 sickle cell anemia,281
Huntington's Disease, 282 Neurofibromatosis, 283 hemochromatosis, 284 and Duchene muscular dystrophy, 285 and an individual's
susceptibility to physical conditions, including cancer, 286 heart dis276 See Human Genome Project Information at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/
project/about.html (visited July 16, 2001); Jennifer M. Jendusa, Pandora'sBox Exposed: Untangling the Web of the Double Helix In Light of Insurance and Managed
Care, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 161, 172-177 (1999).
277 See Lenox, supra, note 270, at 190.
278 Genetic tests identify diseases by isolating a DNA "marker," an "unusual
DNA sequence that is believed to be inherited with a disease causing gene." Lee,
supra note 271, at 190.
279 See Colby, supra note 275, at 452 (noting that insurers have already begun
to genetically discriminate against consumers); Holmes, supra note 275, at 514
(noting that historically, as more predictive diagnostic tests became available,
more and broader risk classifications were established, and consequently, insurers
underwrote and protected fewer people).
280 Lenox, supra note 270, at 194.
281 Lenox, supra note 270, at 194.
282 Huntington's disease is what geneticists call a "one hundred percent penetrant"-100% of individuals possessing the genotype will die from the disease, unless the individual dies of something, else first. Henry T. Greely, Speech: The
Revolution in Human Genetics: Implications for Human Societies, 52 S.C. L. REV.
377, 382 (2001).
283 Gostin, supra note 269, at 114.
284 A disorder of iron metabolism, considered to be genetically determined,
and characterized by excess deposition of iron in the tissues. See DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY

747

( 2 8th

ed. 1994);

MERCK MANUAL

at 1146-1147. People with

hemachromatosis are generally denied life insurance unless they receive regular
withdrawals of blood, reducing the potential for liver and heart damage by reducing iron levels. Keefer, supra note 267, at 1387. See also Paul. R. Billings, Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476, 478
(1992) (insurance company denied coverage due to hereditary hemochromatosis,
despite the fact that the applicant was asymptomatic and never underwent preventative treatment).
285 Gostin, supra note 269, at 110.
286
Id.; Lee, supra note 271, at 190 (lung cancer); See also, Katherine A.
Schneider, Legal Protections for Individuals with HIV, Genetic Predispostionsto
Disease, or Asymptomatic Diseases, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 365, 367
(2000), noting that women who inherit BRCA1/2 mutations have increased lifetime risks of breast cancer (50-85%), ovarian cancer (10-40%), and other types of
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ease, 287 Alzheimer's disease, 288 schizophrenia, 289 and manic depressive illness. 290 Though benefits may ensue from increased genetic
testing, 291 some believe that as our ability to detect predispositions
toward illness increases, so too does the threat that such detection
will be used as a basis for discrimination, thus intensifying conflict
2 92
between the rights of individuals and institutions.

Predicating a decision on whether to extend to an applicant a
life insurance policy based on the possibility that he or she might

one day develop a disease or condition is problematical. 293 Genetic
test results typically indicate a predispositionto a disease, not a conclusive diagnosis-the results of such tests usually only reflect in294
creased or decreased susceptibility to a particular disease.
Further, the severity of symptoms, age of onset, and efficacy of

treatment and management of disease are highly variable. 295 Some
individuals possessing a DNA marker for disease may remain sympcancer. Men who inherit the mutation may have small, increased risks of breast
and pancreatic cancer. Id.
287 Gostin, supra note 269, at 110.
See Mark A. Rothstein, Symposium Article: Predictive Genetic Testing for
288
Alzheimer's Disease in Long-Term Care Insurance, 35 GA. L. REV. 707 (2001).
289
Gostin, supra note 269, at 110.
290 See Jon Beckwith, The Human Genome Initiative and the Impact of Genetic Testing and Screening Technologies, 17 AM. J. L. AND MED. 1, 4 (1991).
291
Such benefits include disease prevention through genetic counseling and
treatment of disorders through genetic manipulation. Gostin, supra note 269, at
110. See also Beckwith, supra note 290, noting that those individuals who are determined by a genetic test to be susceptible to a particular disease may be able to
alter their diet, environment, or working conditions to reduce the probability of
developing the disease. Id. at 8; Lee, supra note 271, at 191, 192 (acknowledging
benefit of early detection for predisposition to illness which creates opportunity for
preventative care).
292 Id.; Gostin, supra note 269, at 142 (noting potential harm of rendering
human beings virtually uninsurable).
293 Natalie E. Zindorf, Discriminationin the 21" Century: Protecting the Privacy of Genetic Information in Employment and Insurance, 36 TULSA L.J. 703, 708
(2001) (designating this as discrimination).
294
Colby, supra note 275, at 455; Beckwith, supra note 290, at 5 (asserting
that though some diseases are correlated with an altered gene, that, in itself, does
not mean that those diseases are related to those susceptibility genes-actual development of disease is due to many factors, including other genes and the
environment).
295 Gostin, supra note 269, at 114. It is not even possible to predict age of
onset or disease course with Huntington's disease, a condition with 100% penetrance. Schneider, supra note 286, at 379.
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296
tom free, while illness in others progresses to a debilitating state.

Gene penetrance 297 and expressivity 298 differ from individual to in-

dividual. 299 Genetic tests do not reflect the role in which environmental factors affect the manifestation of diseases with a genetic
component. 30 0 Appropriately, consumers are concerned that "insurers may misunderstand, misinterpret, and misuse genetic information in creating risk classifications and excluding or limiting
30 1
insurance coverages."
According to scientists, every individual possesses a genetic alteration of some form.30 2 Given the universality of genetic defects,
296

Id. Many gene associated diseases are multi-factorial, and not attributed

to a single gene mutation or genetic marker-accordingly, manifestation of these
diseases depends on a "complex interaction[ I of genetic and environmental factors
that cannot be accurately measured." Id.; Keefer, supra, note 267, at 1378 (noting
that multi-factorial conditions may never manifest themselves in the absence of
other factors). See also, Zindorf, supra note 293, at 705, contrasting multi-factorial
genetic conditions, which will not develop unless certain behavioral and environmental factors come into play, and single-gene conditions, which virtually guarantee that a person will develop the genetic disease; Lee, supra note 271, at 199,
remarking that genetic testing is not based on causality, but correlation, and that
an identified gene will not always result in illness; Gostin, supra note 269, at 116.
297 (the ability of a gene to express itself in a person). TABER'S supra note
266, at 1349.
298
(the degree and manner in which a gene manifests itself once it is penetrated). TABER'S supra note 266, at 638.
299
30

301

Keefer, supra note 267, at 1380.
Keefer, supra note 267, at 1380.
Holmes, supra note 275, at 530. See also Colby, supra note 275, at 456,

where the author notes that genetic tests cannot accurately indicate health risk,
because they doesn't provide information about a person's "'actual state of
health."' (quoting Holmes, supra note 275). What concerns most is that insurers
will misuse genetic information because it is often accorded a notion of exactitude.
See Susan O'Hara, The Use of Genetic Testing in the Health Insurance Industry:
The Creation of a "Biological Underclass," 22 Sw. L. REV. 1211, 1215-1216 (1993).

See also Holmes, supra note 275, at 530-531, remarking on the National Institute of
Health's 1995 report cautioning against over reliance on genetic test results due to
results that reduce conditions or disease to "an expression of particular genes ("reductionism"), or results that improperly label an individual as "sick or abnormal"
("determinism"); Gostin, supra note 269, at 113, 114: "The common belief is that
genetic technologies generated from scientific assessment are always accurate,
highly predictive and capable of identifying an individual's ... inevitable pre-desti-

nation of future disability. The facts are diametrically opposed to this common
belief." The reliability of genetic tests is also limited by mutations that can cause
the same condition. Lee, supra note 271, at 198, 199; Office of Technology Assessment, Medical Testing and Health Insurance 18 (1988) at 135-140.
302
Zindorf, supra note 293, at 712; Lawrence 0. Gostein & James G. Hodge,
Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40

2001]

DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION

91

insurers will increasingly eliminate potential insurance consumers. 30 3 Thus, those who most need insurance are being denied coverage based on genetic testing. 30 4 Adverse insurance decisions are
particularly distressing when rendered on erroneous assumptions

regarding the accuracy and predictability of genetic test results. 305

Alternatively, insurers contend that use of genetic information
in the underwriting process is merely a more refined method of risk
classification. 30 6 While insurers acknowledge that the underwriting
process is discriminatory 30 7 in nature, they argue that it constitutes
"fair discrimination" 30 8 because it is based on "sound actuarial
JURIMETRICS J. 21, 37 (1999). It is estimated that every human being has between
four to eight genetic defects. O'Hara, supra note 301, at 1224.
303 Marcelita C. Anderson, Genetic Testing in Insurance Underwriting: A
Blessing or a Curse? An Examination of the Tension Between Economics and Equity in Using Genetic Testing in Risk Classification, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1499,
1508 (discussing possibility of genetic underclass arising); Lee, supra note 271, at
204-205 (recognizing public fear of generating a genetic underclass). For a response to this argument, see Roberta M. Berry, The Human Genome Project and
the End of Insurance, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 206-207 (1996). Because
everyone possesses genetic defects, insurers could not eliminate all insurds from
the insurance pool, because this would extinguish the market for insurance.
Rather, the insurer would eliminate coverage for the specific genetic predispositions for each insured, consistent with the economic incentive of writing as many
policies as possible. Id. If insurers deny coverage for a significant percentage of
the population, some believe that this may create a "genetic underclass."
304 Lenox, supra note 270, at 195. Insurers may also begin to consider genetic
predispositions as pre-existing conditions, particularly those revealed from genetic
tests with high predictive value, resulting in extensive limiting of coverage. See
Gostin, supra note 269, at 135-136 (analogizing that hypothetical to the fact that
the insurance industry currently conducts its own HIV testing and regards HIV
infection as an uninsurable condition as a response to epidemiologic evidence
which demonstrated the inexorable course of HIV); Lee, supra note 271, at 206,
207 (noting that if genetic defects qualify as pre-existing conditions, the potential
savings that can result from denying coverage could be significant, and that preexisting condition clauses could permit insurers to avoid liability long after a policy
is written).

305

Gostin, supra note 269, at 115.

306 Holmes, supra note 275, at 532.
307 Insurance, by its nature, is discriminatory because individuals who are re-

garded as a higher risk are charged a higher premium. Holmes, supra note 275, at
533. Meyer, supra note 271, at 1280 (arguing that the process of risk classification
"allows economic stimuli to function, which fosters more availability of
coverage").
308 The principle underlying underwriting is "fair discrimination." It is predicated on "efficient, actuarial analysis in establishing risk transference and risk distribution." Holmes, supra note 275, at 531. In underwriting risks, insurance
companies seek "to measure as accurately as is practicable the burden shifted to
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analysis. ' 30 9 Some believe that a denial to write on the basis of
genetic information would eliminate the process of risk classification, and therefore, the current system of insurance would cease to
exist. 310 Insurers also argue that genetic test results are not significantly dissimilar from other medical test results that are already

used in the underwriting process. 311 Moreover, insurance industry
advocates contend that prohibiting insurers from obtaining genetic

the insurance fund by the policy holder and to charge and to charge exactly for
it....
To do so is 'fair' discrimination." Id., at 531, 532. Consequently, "the goal of
insurance underwriting is equity; that is, equitable, but not equal treatment of applicants and policy holders. To achieve that goal, insurers must differentiate
among policyholders by risk classifications and discriminate fairly so that each insured will pay a premium at a level consistent with the risk represented by each
individual insured." Id., at 533. See also Telles v. Commissioner of Insurance, 574
N.E.2d 359, 362 (1991) (unequal treatment of insured who were of different risk
classifications resulted in "fair" discrimination); Keefer, supra note 267, at 1384
(asserting that "fair" and "unfair" discrimination must be distinguished from each
other).
309 Holmes, supra note 275, at 539; Keefer, supra note 267, at 1385, 1386.
310 Meyer, supra note 271, at 1272, 1273.
311 The position of the American Council for Life Insurance is that "genetic
information is as potentially relevant to risk classification as is any other health
information." INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 271, at 1547. For example,
insurers currently underwrite on the basis of an applicant's medical history, including static factors (age, sex, genotype) and diverse factors (occupation, diet, tobacco/alcohol/drug use). Holmes, supra note 275, at 538. These factors statistically
make the manifestation of illness more or less likely. Id; Colby, supra note 275, at
462. Therefore, insurers contend that they should be allowed continued access to
information that they already have access to. Id; Meyer, supra note 271, at 1272,
1273 ("Because almost all diseases or conditions are being found to have a genetic
basis or component, a denial of the right to underwrite on the basis of genetic
information or genetic tests would be equivalent to a denial of the right to underwrite on the basis of all medical information."), quoting the American Council for
Life Insurance; Lee, supra note 271, at 208 (remarking how insurers argue that
genetic testing is analogous to current insurance classification techniques).
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information will encourage adverse selection,3 2 evoking concern
313
for pervasive insurer insolvency.
Whether one regards the use of genetic testing in the underwriting process as reasonable or not depends on how the insurance
industry is viewed. If the industry is regarded strictly as a business,
one cannot condemn the industry for discriminating on the basis of
actuarial data-underwriting fundamentally requires classification
of applicants according to risk, thus, effectively, treating applicants
differently. 31 4 If, however, the insurance industry is viewed as an
instrument of social policy, risk classification on the basis of genetic
information becomes troublesome. The social purpose of insurance
312
Adverse selection is the tendency of an individual to apply for insurance,
knowing he or she is in poor health, while concealing that fact from the insurer.
Meyer, supra note 271, at 1289 (defining adverse selection as the "tendency of
persons who are poorer risks to seek insurance to a greater extent that do persons
who are better risks"); Holmes, supra note 275, at 543 ("If an insurer cannot distinguish and classify high-risk from low-risk applicants, the insurer must offer all applicants the same premium for the same coverage. Low-risk applicants are then
worse off and high-risk applicants are better off than in a properly functioning
insurance risk classification system."); Lee, supra note 271, at 207, 208 (noting that
if genetic information remains undisclosed, it unfairly burdens the low-risk group).
However, Dr. Paul R. Billings, Professor, Department of Medicine at Stanford
University, believes that adverse selection is a trivial issue for the life insurance
industry, similar to the extra cost that results from shoplifting, but nevertheless
does not prevent people from shopping. INTERNATIONAL SYMPOsIUM, supra note
271, at 1552. Similarly, others contend that the adverse selection argument is unpersuasive. See, e.g., Richard H. Underwood & Ronald G. Cadle, Genetics, Genetic Testing, and the Specter of Discrimination: A Discussion Using Hypothetical
Cases, 85 Ky. L. J. 665, 686 (1997), where the authors maintain that if all insurers
are affected by adverse selection due to a prohibition on the use of genetic information, no single insurer would be at a disadvantage relative to the insurance industry as a whole. Furthermore, "insurance is a method of risk-sharing against the
unknown, and the more the unknown becomes knowable in advance, the less the
current system makes sense." Richard A. Bornstein, Genetic DiscriminationInsurability and Legislation: A Closing of Legal Loopholes, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 551, 609.
313 T.H. Cushing, Should There be Genetic Testing in Insurance Risk Classification?, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 249, 254, 255 (1993). If risks are not properly assessed
two scenarios could potentially arise: (1) the insurer will have insufficient funds to
pay claims submitted unless it overcharges those who are at low risk; (2) if the
insurer overassesses and overcharges, the competitive nature of the market would
cause people to purchase insurance elsewhere. Holmes, supra note 275, at 538
(asserting that accurate risk assessment is essential to the business of insurance.
314 Gostin, supra note 269, at 136. "From a business perspective, no rational
distinction can be drawn between genetic prognosis and smoking, hypertension,
high serum cholesterol or HIV infection. In each case, medical data can provide
powerful predictions of future health and longevity." Id.
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is to extend risk across groups, which expands access to insurance. 315 If insurance becomes unavailable to those who most likely
will need it, "the social purpose of insurance is thwarted." 316 Undoubtedly, life insurers have a responsibility to promote social jus-

tice. 317 Nonetheless, though the industry must be responsive to
social needs, it need not ignore actuarial and economical
realities.318
In 1989, the American Council on Life Insurance first determined the industry's use of genetic testing. 3 19 The Council reported

that while no insurance company had performed its own .tests, some
companies accessed genomic information for use in their underwriting procedures. 320 At the present time, though life insurers do not
require genetic testing of all applicants, some insurers currently require genetic testing of some applicants. 321 As genetic testing becomes more used, as anticipated, it will become increasingly
necessary for life insurers to underwrite on the basis of their resuits. 322 Though states have taken steps in an effort to eliminate
genetic discrimination in the health insurance industry and the employment context, they have not done so with life insurance. 323 As
Gostin, supra note 269, at 137.
Id. Opponents of genetic testing assert that public policies for insurance
should be consistent with public policies regarding genetics. Specifically, these policies should include: (1) not discouraging individuals who want to have genetic
testing from doing so because of concerns that test results may be accessible to
third parties; (2) not coercing individuals who do not want genetic testing into
doing so; (3) protecting the privacy and confidentiality of genetic information.
Rothstein, supra note 288, at 728.
317
This is required by state unfair trade practices acts. Meyer, supra note
271, at 1274.
318 To the contrary, "selection and classification of risk [historically have]
been recognized as an absolute necessity, vital to sound and actuarial [and hence,
fairness in] evaluation of risks." Id., quoting S. Gerber, The Economic and Actuarial Aspects of Selection and Classification, 10 FORUM 1205, 1224 (1975).
319 Gostin, supra note 269, at 116.
320
Id.
321 See The Council for Responsible Genetics, Genetic Testing and Life & Disability Insurance (visited July 16, 2001) <http://www.gene-watch.org/programs/GDFAQ-Life_lns.html>, providing that a documented number of cases exist where
consumers have been denied insurance on the basis of their family history, and
were subsequently informed that their application would be reconsidered if they
consented to genetic testing.
322 Meyer, supra note 271, at 1277.
323 Greely, supra note 282, at 383. Several reasons exist for why the public
policy issues surrounding life insurance differ from health insurance: (1) life insurance is usually sold as an individual rather than a group policy and therefore is
315
316
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a result of the failure of the legislature to confront the genetic testing dilemma, the life insurance company may adopt its use of genetic testing as another tool, similar to those used by their own

actuarials, or as an extension of the medical exam complete with
the patient's history, to determine applicant insurability. Like all

tools, genetic tests can be used well or poorly. 324 Fear of discrimination can undermine whatever benefits might be derived from
timely developments in genetic technology.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

This Note advocates a proposal entirely consistent with the life

insurance applicant's inherent right to be apprised of his or her
medical information. Since a statutory duty of disclosure does not
exist in New York, individuals' lives have not been protected and
preserved. 32 5 Although the duty element in a negligence action is

defined as "an expression of the sum total of those considerations
of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to
protection, ' 326 courts have held that no duty of disclosure is owed
without engaging in an analysis of the duty issue.3 27 Since courts
have refused to impose this much needed duty on insurance companies, applicants afflicted with an unknown medical condition that
have submitted to medical exams have lost potentially valuable
treatment time. 328 In addition, nondisclosure may also expose third
medically underwritten on an individual basis; (2) a greater likelihood of adverse
selection exists because life insurance coverage may be of unlimited amounts; (3)
unlike health insurance, life insurance is not viewed as a necessity. Rothstein,
supra note 288, at 724. See also INTERNATIONAL SYMPOsIUM, supra note 271, at
1550 (representative of American Council for Life Insurance remarking that life
insurance is unique, in that it is typically individually underwritten, an therefore,
the life insurer is particularly vulnerable to overselection); Bornstein, supra note
312, at 608 (author notes that dissimilar protection against health and life insurance discrimination is consistent with social policy because few feel that life insurance is a basic right, and that adverse selection plays an integral role in considering
life insurance and genetic discrimination).
324 Greely, supra note 282, at 390 ("[Tlhey will give us a greater ability to
cure or prevent human suffering; they also give us a greater ability to inflict such
suffering.").
325 See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
326 Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp at 251.
327 See supra notes 37-130 and accompanying text; Greenwald, supra note 7,
at 136.
328 See supra notes 168-188 and accompanying text.
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parties to unknown health risks. 329 Existing precedent, therefore,
yields unsatisfactory results. 330 The notification provision proposed
by this Note would provide insurance companies with clear guidelines to enable them to inform their applicants and third parties of
health risks.33 1 As such, New York mandatory disclosure legislation
must be enacted as a means of saving lives and reducing loss of
treatment time.

332

Amy Bucossi

329
330

See supra notes 189-208 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37-130 and accompanying text; Greenwald, supra note 7,

at 167. See also Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, where the court was reluctant to impose mandatory disclosure due to the absence of a statutorily imposed duty.
331 See supra notes 234-250 and accompanying text.
332
Greenwald, supra note 7, at 167 (noting similar benefits in federal
context).
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED MODEL NEW YORK STATE DISCLOSURE
STATUTE

§ 2611A

(1) DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this section, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
"Adverse underwriting decision" means (a) a declination of insurance coverage as applied for, or (b) an offer to issue insurance coverage at a higher than standard rate.
"Unfavorable medical test" means test results that indicate that an
individual possesses an adverse medical condition, which if left unattended to, will result in loss of treatment time or health risks to
third parties. Such results include, but are not limited to blood
counts that indicate the presence of an abnormality, blood profiles
which reveal the presence of antibodies or antigens to the HIV virus, elevated lipid levels, antibodies to hepatitis, positive tuberculosis readings, and tests that reveal abnormal liver or kidney function.
"HIV Virus" means infection with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus or any other related virus identified as a probable causative
agent of AIDS."
"AIDS" means acquired immune deficiency syndrome, as may be
defined from time to time by the centers for disease control of the
United States Public Health Service.
"Designee" means a health care provider who is licensed, certified,
registered, or otherwise authorized by law to provide an item, service, or disclose information that constitutes health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a profession.
"Health care" means:
(A) any sale or dispensing of a drug, device, equipment, or
other item to an individual, pursuant to a prescription,
and
(B)

any preventative, predictive, diagnostic, therapeutic, rehabilitative, maintenance, or palliative care, counseling,
service, or procedure
(i) with respect to the physical or mental condition of
the individual, or

N.Y.L.
(ii)
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affecting the structure or function of the human
body or any part of the human body

"Insurer" means the insurance company with whom contracts between the company and policy holders, whereby the company
agrees, in return for premium payments, to pay a specified sum to
the designated beneficiary upon the death of the insured.
(2) OBLIGTATIONS OF INSURER
(a) In the event that an insurer's adverse underwriting decision
is based in whole or in part on the result of an unfavorable
medical test, the insurer shall notify the individual of the adverse underwriting decision and ask the individual to elect in
writing, unless the individual has already done so, whether to
have the specific related test results disclosed directly to the
individual or to such other person as the individual may designate ("designee").
(b) An insurer who has materially failed to comply with the
provisions of this section shall be subject to the sanctions provided in Section 2611A(4).
(3) BREACH OF DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION OF INSURER
(a) An insurer shall be liable, to the extent and in the manner
provided in Section 2611A(2), to the individual proposed for
insurance coverage for all damages incurred as a result of the
insurer's failure to disclose under Section 2611A(2). The movant shall have the burden of proving a failure to disclose.
(b) Whether an insurer failed to satisfy the disclosure standards set forth in Section 2611A(2) shall be determined by taking into account all material facts and circumstances involved
in the dispute. Unless the context provides otherwise, the following factors shall be taken into account in determining
whether the insurer failed to adequately disclose the results of
an adverse medical test:
(1)

the extent to which an individual proposed for insurance coverage could have avoided death or resulting physical harm through medical treatment
unsought due to lack of disclosure on the part of the
insurer;
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(2)

the extent to which an individual proposed for insurance coverage could have avoided exposing third
parties to physical harm due to lack of disclosure on
the part of the insurer;

(3)

the severity of physical harm that an insured could
reasonably expect to occur as a result of the insurer's
failure to disclose;
the burden disclosure would have imposed on the
insurer;

(4)
(5)

the affirmative steps the insurer took in an effort to
apprise the individual proposed for insurance of his
or her adverse medical condition;

(6)

the feasibility of informing the individual proposed
for insurance coverage or designee; and

(7)

any other relevant circumstances
(c) A duty to disclose can be satisfied by delivering a written
report to the applicant's treating physician, and shall constitute
prima facie evidence of adequate disclosure.
(4) REMEDIES
(a) Any insurer who has materially failed to comply with this
statute shall be subject, in addition to any other penalties that
may be prescribed by law, to:
1. A civil penalty of not less than $
for each
such violation, but not to exceed $
, and not
to exceed $
in the aggregate for multiple violations in any one year;
2.

actual damages; and

3. punitive damages
(b) In the case of a civil action brought by an aggrieved party
brought under Subsection 2611A(2)(a) in which the movant
has prevailed, the court may assess against the respondent a
reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs and expenses (including expert fees) reasonably incurred.
(5) EFFECTIVE DATE
This statute shall become effective

